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PRESENTED BV 



WOODROW WILSON'S 
ADMINISTRATION 
and ACHIEVEMENTS 




cAmericanism 



T^ATRIOTISM consists in some very 
•*- practical things — practical in that 
they belong to the life of every day, that 
they wear no extraordinary distinction 
about them, that they are connected 
with commonplace duty. The way to be 
patriotic in America is not only to love 
America, but to love the duty that lies 
nearest to our hand and know that in 
performing it we are serving our coun- 
try. — From President Wibon's Address 
at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, 
July 14, 1914. 




IVoodroyp JVilsons 



<^dmtnist?^atio?i a?id ^chie^efnetits 



Being a Compilation from Jhe Newspaper 

Press of Eight Years of the World's 

Greatest History, particularly as 

Concerns America, Its 

People and their 

Affairs 



By 

Frank B. Lord and 
James William Bryan 



JAMES WILLIAM BRYAN PRESS 

WASHINGTON, D. C. 



# 






COPYRIGHT, 1921 



Frank B. Lord and James William Bryan 



All Rights Reserved 

Gift 
^ublishe 
JUL 20 fltt-^ 






IP 



CONTENTS 

Page 
Americanism— From President Wilson's Independence Hall 

Address, Philadelphia, July, 1914 2 

History's Proving Ground 7""^ 

Portrait in typophotogravure of President Wilson at Amer- 
ica's Entry in the War — Charcoal Sketch by Hattie E. 

Burdette. .'. 10 

WooDROw Wilson's Administration — Eight Years ot the 
World's Greatest History— Co/Yr/^j-_v of the New York 

Times ^ 1-^9 

Early Accomplishments of Administration 15 

Foreign Policies, 1913-1914 22 

Landmarks in Mexican Policy 23 

Appeals for Mediation 3° 

The European War, 1914-1916 3° 

Federal Reserve— From President Wilson's Address to 

Congress, April, 1913 3' 

Typophotogravure of Governor Wocdrow Wilson and Joseph 

P. Tumulty with Newspaper Men, 191 2 32 

Senator Glass on Woodrow Wilson, 1921 — Courtesy of the 

New York Times 3" 

Personal Messages to Congress from President Wilson's 

First Address to Congress, April 8, 1913 39 

Typophotogravure of President Wilson Reading First Mes- 
sage to Congress, April 8, 1913 4° 

Mediation Efforts, 1916-1917 43 

Hamilton Holt's Tribute 44 

United States in the War 4° 

Rural Credits from President Wilson's Remarks on Sign- 
ing Bill, July, 1916 4^ 

Typophotogravure of the President in 1918 5° 

The Fourteen Points S'^'~S9 

Peace Conference and Treaty, 1919 61 

The Closing Year, 1920-1921 6{ 

5 



Cartoon — The Founders of the League of Nations, by 

Baldbridge in the Stars and Stripes 70 

Verse — Beware of Visons, by Alfred Noyes 70 

Poem — In Flanders Fields, by Lieutenant Colonel John McCrea. 71 
Poem — America's Answer, by R. W. Lillard. Courtesy of New 

York Evening Post 7^ 

Sonnets — Recessional by Richard Linthicum — Courtesy of the 



New York World . 



-ji 



Workmen's Compensation — ^From President Wilson's Speech 

of Acceptance, 1916 73 

Typophotogravure of Portrait of President Wilson at Peace 

Conference, by George W. Harris 74 

WooDROw Wilson's Place in History — An Appreciation 
by General The Right Honorable Jan Christian Smuts, 
1921 75-79 

Cartoon — Without the Advice or Consent of the Senate, 

by Kirby in the New York World 80 

We Die Without Distinction — From the President's Ad- 
dress at Swarthmore College, 1913 80 

WooDROw Wilson — An Interpretation — Courtesy of the New 

York World 81-93 

Typophotogravure of the President on Board Ship Return- 
ing from Peace Conference 87 

The President and the Peace Treaty., 87 

Typophotogravure of the President at the Last Meeting 

with his Cabinet, 1921 88 

Two Pictures — From Address by Joseph P. Tumulty 88 

The Covenant of the League of Nations 93~io° 



HISTORY'S PROVING GROUND 



^,^HE MODERN NEWSPAPER through its intensive, 
'fjk^ij fti}] minute and zealous activities in searching out, present- 
^^ ^^ ing ''ind interpreting each day the news of the entire 
world, is tracing with unerring accuracy the true and 
permanent picture of the present. This picture will endure as 
und sputed history for all time. 

Let us concede that the newspaper writer sometimes, in the 
passion of the hour, goes far afield. It is equally true that no 
statement of importance can thus be made that is not immediately 
challenged, answered and reanswered until, through the fierce 
fires of controversy the dross is burned away and the gold of 
established fact remains. Not alone the fact stands out, but also 
the world's immediate reaction to that fact, the psychology of the 
event and the man dominating the cause and the effect. 

The modern newspaper is the proving ground of history. To 
illustrate let us suppose that our newspaper press, as we know it 
today, had existed in Shakespeare's time. Would there now be 
any controversy over the authorship of the world's greatest 
dramas? 

Could the staff photographer of a Sunday supplement as 
efficient as one of our present day corps have snapped Mohammed 
in his tent and a keen reporter of today's type questioned him as 
to his facts and data, would not all of us now be Mohammedans 
or Mohammed be forgot? Had such newspapers as ours fo lowed 
Washington to Valley Forge and gone with him to meet Corn- 
wallis, would the father of his country be most intimately remem- 
bered through the cherry tree episode? Consider the enlighten- 
ment which would have been thrown upon the pages of history 
had a corps of modern newspaper correspondents reported the 
meeting of John and the Barons at Runnymeade or accompanied 
Columbus on his voyages of discovery. 

7 



Would not even Lincoln be more vivid in our minds and what 
we really know of him not so shrouded in anecdote and story? 

In Washington's time /America became a Nation. In Lincoln's 
time our country was united and made one. In Wilson's time our 
Nation received recognition as the greatest of the world powers. 
It remained, hc^wever, for Wilson alone to reach the highest 
pinnacle ot international prominence in the face of the pitiless 
cross fires of today's newspaper press. Yet this inquisition, often 
more than cruel, was not without its constructive value, for it 
has searched out every fact and established every truth beyond the 
successful attack, of any future denial. 

This little volume — the first perhaps of its kind concerning any 
man or event — presents with no further word of its compilers a 
summary of Woodrow Wilson's Administration and Achieve- 
ments — eight years of the world's greatest history — taken entirely 
from the newspaper press. 

It contains not one statement that has not been accurately 
weighed in the critical scales of controversy. Its object is simply 
to present the truth and have this truth early in the field so that 
the political canard which was so shamelessly indulged in during 
the close of the Wilson Administration may not be crystalized in 
the public mind and cloud for a time the glorious luster of his 
name. 

It shall be as Maximilian Harden, the keenest thinker of the 
defeated Germans said: "Only one conqueror's work will endure 
— Wilson's thought." 

Frank B. Lord and 
James William Bryan 




James tl'm. Bryan 



March 5, 1916: Portrait of Mr. Wilson drawn in charcoal by Miss 

Hattie E. Burdett, and considered by many as the President's best 

likeness at the entrance of America into the World War 



IVoodroyp IVilsofis 
Administration 



Eight Years of the World'' s 
(greatest History 



r//^OODROW WILSON took the oath of office as President 
rf^ on March 4, 19 13, after one of the most sweeping triumphs 
ever known in Presidential elections. Factional war in 
the Republican Party had given him 435 electoral votes in the 
preceding November, to Roosevelt's 88 and Taft's 8; and though 
he was a "minority President," he had had a popular plurality of 
more than 2,000,000 over Roosevelt and nearly 3,000,000 over 
Taft. 

Moreover, the party which was coming back into control of 
the Government after sixteen years of wandering in the wilderness 
had a majority of five in the Senate and held more than two-thirds 
of the seats in the lower house. With the opposition divided into 
two wings, which hated each other at the moment more than they 
hated the Democrats, the party seemed to have a fairly clear field 
for the enactment of those sweeping reforms which large elements 
of the public had been demanding for more than a decade. 

With this liberalism, which was not disturbed at being called 
radicalism, Mr. Wilson in his public career had been consistently 
identified. During his long service as a university professor and 
President he had been brought to the attention of a steadily 
growing public by his books and speeches on x^merican political 
problems, in which he had spoken the thoughts which in those 
years were in the minds of millions of Americans on the need for 
reforms to lessen those contacts between great business interests 
and the Government which had existed, now weaker and now 
stronger, ever since the days of Mark Hanna. 

11 



The ideas of Mr. Wilson as to governmental reform, to be sure, 
went further than those of many of his followers, and took a 
different direction from the equally radical notions of others. An 
avowed admirer of the system of government which gives to the 
Cabinet the direction of legislation and makes it responsible to 
the Legislature and the people for its policies, he had been writing 
for years on the desirability of introducing some of the elements 
of that system into the somewhat rigid tramework of the American 
Government, and in his brief experience in politics had put into 
practice his theory that the Executive, even under American 
constitutional forms, not only could but should be the active 
director of the policy of the dominant party in legislation as well. 
But a public addicted to hero worship, little concerned with 
questions of governmental machinery, and inclined to believe that 
certain parts of the work of the Constitutional Convention of 
1787 had been accomplished under divine inspiration, had corn- 
paratively little interest in the Wilson concepts of reform in 
political methods. They regarded him, in the language of those 
days, as a champion of the "plain people" against "the interests." 
They had seen in his long struggle with antagonistic influences in 
Princeton University — a struggle from which he retired defeated, 
but made famous and prepared for wider fields by the publicity 
which he had won by the conflict — a sort of miniature repre- 
sentation of this antithesis between the people and big business 
and they had learned to regard Mr. Wilson as a fighter for demo- 
cratic principles against aristocratic tendencies and the money 
power. 

This reputation he had vastly expanded during his two years as 
Governor of New Jersey. His term had been distinguished not 
only by the passage of a number of reform measures consonant 
with the liberal ideas of the period, but by a spectacular struggle 
between the Governor and an old-time machine of his own party^- 
the very machine which had nominated him. In this fight, as in 
his conflict at Princeton, he had been for a time defeated, but here 
again the fight itself had made him famous and won him a hun- 
dred supporters outside of his own State for every one he lost at 
home. 

At the very outset of his term, he had entered, against all 
precedent, into the fight in the Legislature over a Senatorial 
election. Demanding that the Legislature keep faith with the 
people, who in a preferential primary had designated a candidate 
for United States Senator who did not cornmand the support of 
the organization, he had won his fight on this particular issue and 
set himself before the public as a sort of tribune of the people who 
conceived it his duty to interpose his influence wherever other 
officials showed a tendency to disregard the popular will. 

In the legislative fight for the enactment of reform legislation, 
too, the Governor had continually intervened in the character of 

12 



"lobbyist for the people," and while the opposition of the old 
political organization, which he had aroused in the fight for the 
Senatorship, had partially halted the progress of this program, 
the great triumph in November, 191 2, had returned a Legislature 
so strong in support of the Governor that before he left Trenton 
for Washington practically all of the measures included in his 
scheme had become laws. Mr, Wilson, then, was known to the 
country not only as a reformer but as a successful reformer; and 
his victories over the professional politicians of the old school had 
removed most of the latent fear of the ineffectuality of a scholar 
in politics. In point of fact, the chief interest of this particular 
scholar had always lain in politics, and it was partly chance and 
partly economic determinism that had diverted him in early life 
from the practice of politics to the teaching of its principles and 
history. 

Abroad, where his election was received with general satis- 
faction, he was still regarded as the scholar in politics, for a Europe 
always inclined to exaggerate the turpitude of professional politi- 
cians in America liked to see in him the first fruits of them that 
slept, the pioneer of the better classes of American society coming 
at last into politics to clean up the wreckage made by ward bosses 
and financial interests. Scarcely any American President ever 
took office amid so much approbation from the leading organs of 
European opinion. 

His radicalism caused no great concern abroad and was re- 
garded with apprehension only in limited circles at home — and 
even here the apprehension was more over the return to power of 
the Democratic Party than on account of specific fears based on 
the character of the President-elect. The business depression of 
1913 and 1914 would probably have been inevitable upon the 
inauguration of any Democratic President, particularly one pledged 
to the carrying out of extensive alterations in the commercial 
system of the country. For in 191 2 Wilson had been in effect the 
middle-of-the-road candidate, the conservative liberal. Most of 
the wild men had followed Roosevelt, and the most conservative 
business circles felt at least some relief that there had been no 
re-entry into the White House of the Rough Rider, with a gift 
for stinging phrases and a cohort of followers in which the lunatic 
fringe was disproportionately large and unusually ragged. 

So Woodrow Wilson entered the Presidential office under con- 
ditions which in some respects were exceptionally favorable. His 
situation was in reality, however, considerably less satisfactory 
than it seemed. To begin with, he was, in spite of everything, a 
minority President and the representative of a minority party. 
He had even, during a good part of the Baltimore Convention, 
been a minority candidate for the nomination. If the two wings 
of the Republicans should during the ensuing Administration 
succeed in burying their differences and coming together once 

13 



more, the odds were in favor of their success in 191 6. Moreover, 
the Democrats were ciefinitely expected to do something. Dis- 
satisfaction with the general influence of financial interests in 
public life, a dissatisfaction which had gradually concentrated on 
the protective tariff as the chief weapon of those interests, had 
been growing for years past. In 1908 a public aroused by Roose- 
velt but afraid of Bryan had decitied to trust the Republican 
Party to undo its own work, and the answer of the party had been 
the Payne-Aldrich tarifl". That tariff broke the Republican Party 
in two and paved the way for the return of Roosevelt; it had also, 
in 1910, given the Democrats the control of the House of Repre- 
sentatives. 

Now, at last the Democrats had full control of both Legislature 
and Executive, and the country expected them to do something: 
unreasonably, it was at the same time rather afraid that they 
would do something. To do something but not too much, to meet 
the popular demands without destroying the economic well-being 
which the Republican ascendency had undoubtedly promoted, to 
insure a better distribution of wealth without crippling the pro- 
duction of wealth — this was the problem of a President who had 
had only two years in public life, and most of whose assistants 
would have to be chosen from men almost without executive 
experience. 

The chief peculiarity of President Wilson's political position 

lay in a theory of American Government which had first come to 

him in his undergraduate days at Princeton and which had been 

steadilv developing ever since. That theory, briefly, was that the 

x'\merican Constitution permitted, and the practical development 

of American politics should have compelled, the President to act 

not only as Chief of State but as Premier — as the active head ot 

the majority party, personally responsible to the people for the 

execution of the program of legislation laid down in that party's 

platform. Fanciful as it had seemed when first put forward by 

him many years before, that concept of the Presidency was now, 

perhaps for the first time, within the reach of practical realization. 

Dissatisfaction with the general secrecy and irresponsibility 

of Congressional committees which had charge of the direction ot 

legislation, in so far as there was any direction, had been growing 

for years; and an incident of the revolt against the Payne-Aldrich 

tariff and the break in the Republican Party had been the internal 

revolution in the House of Representatives, taking away from the 

Speaker the power of controlling legislation which he had for 

some time enjoyed, and which would have been a serious obstacle 

to Presidential leadership such as Wilson had in mind. Moreover, 

the activity of Cleveland and Roosevelt had shown the public 

that even in time of peace an energetic President had a much wider 

field of action than most Presidents had attempted to cover, and 

the more recent example of Taft had increased the demand for a 

U 



Early Accomplishments of Administration 

Underwood-Simmons tariffs establishing the lowest average of 
duties in seventy-five years, enacted October j, /p/j. 

Federal Reserve act, organizing the banking system and stabiliz- 
ing the currency, December 2j, igij. 

Clayton Anti-Trust law. 

Creation of Federal Trade Commission. 

Repeal of Panama Canal tolls exemption. 

End of dollar diplomacy . 

Negotiation of a treaty {never ratified) with Colombia to satisfy 
the Colombian claim in Panama. 



President who would act, would not leave action to those men 
around him who "knew exactly what they wanted.'" 

There were, however, two great obstacles to the operation of 
Mr. Wilson's theory. The first was constitutional. In Europe 
the Premier who directs the legislative policy of the Government 
is answerable not only in Parliament but to the people whenever 
his policy has ceased, or seems to have ceased, to command public 
confidence. The President of the United States finishes out his 
term, no matter how bad his relations with Congress or how 
general his unpopularity among the people. The check upon his 
leadership, as Mr. Wilson presently realized, could come only at 
the end of his term, when the President as a candidate for re- 
election came before the public for approval or rejection. So, 
even before his first inauguration, Mr. Wilson had written to 
A. Mitchell Palmer, then a Congressman, expressing disapproval, 
quite aside from any personal connection with the issue, of the 
proposal to restrict the President to a single term. That had been 
a plank in the Democratic platform of the year before; already 
it was apparent that this phase of the party's program would 
have to be sacrificed in order to make the party leader responsible 
in the true sense for the program as a whole. But that plank had 
not been seriously intended, and by 1916 the march of events 
had made it a dead letter. 

A more serious difficulty, in March, 1913, lay in the fact that 
the President was not the party leader. There was an enormous 
amount of Wilson sentiment over the country, and there were 
many enthusiastic Wilson men; but a good many of these were 
of the old mugwump type, or men who had hitherto held aloof 
from politics. In 1912, as later in 1917 and 1918, there was seen 
the anomaly of a leader who was himself an orthodox and often 
narrow partisan, yet drew most of his support trom independent 
elements or even from the less firmly organized portions of the 

15 



opposition. And not only were most of the Wilson men inde- 
pendents or political amateurs; a still greater stumbling block lay 
in the fact that very few of them had been elected to office. In 
the great Democratic landslide of 191 2 the Democrats who had 
got on the payroll were mostly the old party wheel-horses who had 
been lingering in the outer darkness of opposition for sixteen years 
past, or more or less permanent representatives of the Solid South. 

In so far as the party had a leader at that time, it was Bryan. 
Bryan had played the leading part in the Baltimore Convention. 
If he had not exactly nominated Wilson, he had at least done more 
than anybody else to destroy Wilson's chief competitors. There 
were not enough Bryan men in the country to elect Bryan, not 
even enough Bryan men in the party to nominate Bryan a fourth 
time; but there were enough Bryan Democrats to ruin the policy 
of the incoming President if he did not conciliate Bryan with 
extreme care. 

So the first efforts of the new Administration had to be a com- 
promise between what Wilson wanted and what Bryan would 
permit. This was seen first of all in the composition of the Cabinet, 
which Bryan himself headed as Secretary of State. Josephus 
Daniels, who as Secretary of the Navy was to be one of the prin- 
cipal targets of criticism for the next eight years, was also a Bryan 
man. Ot the "Wilson men" of the campaign, W'illiam G. McAdoo 
was chosen as Secretary of the Treasury, not without some grave 
misgivings as to his ability, which were not subsequently justified 
by his conduct of the office. The rest of the Cabinet was notable 
chiefly for the presence of three men from Texas, a State whose 
prominence reflected not only its growing importance and its 
fidelity to the party but also the influence of Colonel Edward 
Mandell House, a private citizen who had risen from 'making 
Governors at Austin to take a prominent part in the making of a 
President in 191 2. At the beginning of the Administration and 
throughout almost all of President Wilson's tenure of office he 
was the President's most influential adviser, a sort of super- 
Minister and Ambassador in general; and his position from the 
first caused a certain amount of heartburning among the poli- 
ticians who resented this prominence of an outsider who had never 
held office. 

Perhaps because many of his official aids and assistants were 
more or less imposed upon him, the President showed from the 
first a tendency to rely on personal agents and unofficial advisers. 
And this was to become more prominent as the years passed, as 
new issues arose of which no one would have dreamed in the 
Spring of 1913, issues for which the ordinary machinery and 
practice of American Government were but little prepared. 

For the eight years which began on March 4, 1913, were to be 
wholly unlike any previous period in American history. An 
Administration chosen wholly in view of domestic problems was 

16 



to find itseh chiefly engaged with foreign relations of unexampled 
complexity and importance. The passionate issues of 191 2 were 
soon to be forgotten. Generally speaking, the dominant questions 
before the American people in 191 2 and 1913 were about the same 
as in 1908, or 1904, or even earlier. But from 1914 on every year 
brought a changed situation in which the issues of the previous 
year had already been crowded out of attention by new and more- 
pressing problems. 

No American President except Lincoln had ever been concerned 
with matters ot such vital importance to the nation; and not 
even Lincoln had had to deal with a world so complex and so 
closely interrelated with the Lnited States. Washington, Jeffer- 
son and Madison had to guide the country through the complica- 
tions caused by a great world war; but the nation which they led 
was small and obscure, concerned only in keeping out of trouble 
as long as it could. The nation which Wilson ruled was a powerful 
State whose attitude from the very first was of supreme importance 
to both sides. And the issues raised by the war pushed into the 
background questions which hatl seemed important in 1913 — and 
which, when the war was over, became important once more. 

None of this, of course, could have been predicted on March 
4, 1913. A new man with a new method had been elected Presi- 
dent and intrusted with the meeting of certain pressing domestic 
problems. At the moment the public was more interested in the 
man than in his method; and not till the crisis had been success- 
fully passed did popular attention concentrate on the manner of 
accomplishment rather than on the things accomplished. 







"Problems at Home, igij-igi4 

NE of the passages of President Wilson's inaugural address 
contained a list of "the things that ought to be altered,' 
which included: 



A tariff" which cuts us off from our proper part in the commerce of the world, 
violates the just principles of taxation, and makes the Government a facile instru- 
ment in the hands of private interests; a banking and currency system based upon 
the necessity of the Government to sell its bonds fifty years ago and perfectly 
adapted to concentrating cash and restricting credits; an industrial system which, 
take it on all sides, financial as well as administrative, holds capital in leading 
strings, restricts the liberties and limits the opportunities of labor, and exploits 
without renewing or conserving the natural resources of the country; a body of 
agricultural activities never yet given the efficiency of great business undertakings or 
served as it should be through the instrumentality of science taken directly to the 
farm, or aff'orded the facilities of credit best suited to its practical needs. 

The items had been set down in the order of their immediate 
importance. First came the tariff, for the tariff had come to be 
in the minds of many Americans a symbol of the struggle between 
the "plain people" and "the interests." The'j Payne-Aldrich 
tariff, enacted by a party pledged to tariff revision, had been not 

17 



only an injury but an insult, and if any American Presidential 
election could ever be interpreted as a popular referendum on 
any specific policy the election of 191 2 meant that the Payne- 
Aldrich tariff must be revised. At the time of the enactment of 
that bill Mr. Wilson had written a critical article in The North 
American Review which expressed a widespread popular senti- 
ment in its criticism of "the policy of silence and secrecy" prev- 
alent in the committee rooms when this and other tariffs 
had been drawn up anci a demand for procedure in the open where 
the public could find out exactly who wanted what and why. 
Joined with this objection to the methods of tariff making were 
some observations by Mr. Wilson on the principles of tariff revi- 
sion. He saw and said that a complete return to a purely revenue 
tariff was not then possible even if desirable, anci that the im- 
mediate objective of tariff reform should be the adjustment of 
rates so as to permit competition and thereby necessitate effi- 
ciency of operation. 

The ideas which in March, 1909, were merely the criticism of a 
college professor had become in March, 1913, the program of the 
President of the United States, the leader of the majority party, 
determined to get his program enacted into law. Congress was 
convened in special session on April 7, and the President delivered 
a message on the one topic of the tariff. Going back to the prec- 
edent of Washington and x^dams, broken by Jefferson and never 
resumed again, he read his message in person to the Congress as 
if to emphasize the intimate connection between the Executive 
and legislation which was to be a feature of the new Administra- 
tion. The principle of tariff reform laid down in that bill was a 
practical and not a theoretical consideration, the need of ending 
an industrial situation fostered by high tariffs wherein "nothing is 
obliged to stand the tests of efficiency and economy in our world 
of big business, but everything thrives by concerted agreement. 
The object of the tariff duties henceforth laid must be 
effective competition, the whetting of x^merican wits by contest 
with the wits of the world." 

The measure which Democratic leaders had already prepared 
for that purpose and which eventually became known as the 
Underwood-Simmons Act was intended to accomplish its end only 
gradually. Notoriously outrageous schedules of the Payne-Aldrich 
Act, such as that dealing with wool, were heavily reduced, and the 
general purport of the bill is perhaps expressed in the phrase of 
Professor Taussig, that it was "the beginning of a policy of much 
moderated protection." It went through the House without 
much difficulty, passing on May 8, and then it struck the Senate 
committee rooms, from which no tariff bill had ever emerged 
c]uite as innocent as it entered. The usual expeditionary forces 
of lobbyists concentrated in Washington and the Senate talked 
it over, while Summer came on and- Washington grew hotter and 

18 



hotter. In course of time Senators began to come to the Presicient 
and tell him that it was hopeless to get the bill through at that 
session and that Washington was getting pretty hot. The Presi- 
dent replied that he knew it was hot, but that Congress would 
have to stav there till that bill was passed. Already he had given 
the lower house something to keep it busy while the Senate 
wrestled with the tariff. , , r j r 

As for the lobbv, the President had his own method of dealing 
with that. On Nlay 26 he issued a public statement calling 
attention to the "extraordinary exertions" of lobbyists i'\con- 
nection with the tariff. "The newspapers are being filled," he 
said, "with paid advertisements calculated to mislead not onlv 
the 'iudgment of the public men, but also the public opinion of 
the country itself. There is every evidence that money without 
limit is being spent to maintain this lobby. . .' . It is of serious 
interest to the countrv that the people at large should have no 
lobby and be voiceless in these matters, while the great bodies of 
astute men seek to create an artificial opinion and to overcome the 
interests of the public for their private profit." The outraged 
dignitv of Senators and Representatives, not to mention lobbyists, 
rose to protest against this declaration. A Republican Senator 
even declared that the President, who had been actively urging 
his views on legislators just as he had done in New .Jersey was 
himself the chief lobbyist in connection with the Tarifir Bill. A 
Sf-nate Committee was appointed to find out if there had been 
anv lobbving, and discovered that there had. Meanwhile the 
bill was being argued out in the Senate, and the President stood 
firm against any substantial modification. It was finally passed 

on Oct. 3. ■ J r imi 

It was a vindication of the platform promise and a tulhlJment 
of the dutv with which the party had been charged in the last 
election, and it was a notable triumph tor the personal policy ot 
the President-Premier, who more than anybody else had literally 
forced the bill through Congress. The tariff had taken such a 
prominent place in the fight against business influence in the 
Government that the passage of a bill which made a material 
reduction in rates was a moral victory for progressivism at large, 
and for President Wilson in particular. • , n- u 

The actual effect of the tariff, or rather the actual effect that 
it might have had, is something impossible to estimate at this 
time. Before it had been in operation a year, before the country 
had had a chance to studv the new conditions brought in by ttie 
legislation of the first vear of the Wilson Administration the war 
broke out in Eurpoe. The conditions which had prevailed througfi 
half a century of tariff making had ceased to exist. They have 
not yet returned. A subsidiary feature of the Underwood-Sim- 
mons Act, however, was to attain enormous importance in the 
course of the Wilson Administrations. To supply the deficiency 

19 



in revenue which the lowered duties might be expected to produce 
there was added an income tax law, which had recently been per- 
mitted by constitutional amendment. Even the light duties of 
the first year, with their $3,000 exemption, were denounced by 
conservatives as a rich man's tax; but within four years more the 
exemption was to be lowered to $1,000, and the peak of the tax 
raised to tenfold its original height. 

So long as the Wilson Administration was reducing the tariff, 
it was carrying out the traditional policy of the Democratic Party; 
but the next task which the President laid before Congress was 
much more delicate and much more important. As the event 
showed, the result was to be of infinitely greater benefit to the 
nation. Reform of the currency had long been an evident neces- 
sity, and the panic of 1907 had recently called attention to the 
dangers of the system based on emergency measures of the Civil 
War period. Mr. Wilson himself had said much of the necessity 
of freeing business from unnatural restrictions, among which the 
makeshift currency system was included. During the previous 
Administration Senator Aldrich's plan for a centralized reserve 
bank had been widely discussed, and innumerable modifications 
had been suggested. Democratic leaders were already working 
on plans for currency reform when the new Administration came 
in, and on June 26 a bill was introduced in the House by Carter 
Glass and in the Senate by Robert L. Owen. 

It took six months of hard work to get this adopted, but it was 
a marvelous achievement to get it adopted at all. For a large 
faction of the Democratic Party, including its most influential 
leader, still represented the old hostility to the "money power," 
which regarded the overthrow of the United States Bank as the 
great triumph of the American Democracy. The Glass-Owen 
bill differed from Senator Aldrich's scheme largely in the direction 
of decentralization and giving more control to the Government 
and less to the banks, but, even so, it was a suspicious document 
to those numerous Democrats whose economic ideas were obtained 
from the Greenback and Populist Parties of former years. And 
it was not satisfactory to the majority of the articulate bankers of 
the country, who wanted a central bank instead of the regional 
division of the reserve functions, and who thought that the banks 
should have a good (deal to say about appointments to the Federal 
Reserve Board. 

As late as the beginning of December there were still three 
separate bills before Congress, but the party organization under 
the President-Premier held together, and on December 23 the 
Glass-Owen Bill, with some modifications acquired en route, was . 
signed by the President. The pressure on the White House 
during that struggle was perhaps the hardest which President 
Wilson encountered during his entire eight years. Many an 
honest Democrat thought the fundamental principles of the party 

20 



were being betrayed, and many a Senator or Representative who 
regarded the reserve banks with profound alarm felt, neverthe- 
less, that if the iniquitous things were going to be established there 
ought to be one in his home town. When Paul M. Warburg, a 
Wall Street banker, was appointed as one of the members of the 
Federal Reserve Board, there were more protests from politicians 
who professed to believe that the nation was being delivered over 
to the money power, while the complaints of bankers who thought 
that the banks were being given over to politicians had not yet 
died down. But when the act once went into operation criticism 
almost disappeared; and in the course of a few months the un- 
precedented financial strain attendant on the outbreak of the. 
European war made it plain to almost anybody that without "this ^ 
timely reform of the banking system 1914 would have seen a 
disaster far worse than that of 1907. 

The work of "striking the shackles off business" was continued 
in 1914 by the introduction of bills to carry out the President's 
recommendations forprohibiting interlocking directorates, clarify- 
ing the anti-trust laws, establishing an Interstate_ Trade Commis- 
sion, and supervising the issue of railroad securities. The chief 
results of this discussion were the creation of the Trade Commis- 
sion, a body of which much more was expected at the time than 
it has accomplished, and the passage of the Clayton Anti-Trust 
Act, which exempted farmers' combinations and labor unions 
from the anti-trust laws, and wrote into the statutes the declara- , - 
tion that labor is not a commodity. The La Follette Seamen's 
Bill, drawn by Andrew Furuseth of the Seamen's Union, was 
introduced in 1913 and not enacted until much later. Its friends 
declared that it would at least establish decent living conditions 
for sailors, and its opponents, including nearly all the shipping 
interests, asserted that, so long as foreign ship owners were not 
under similar restrictions, the bill would ruin the American Mer- 
chant Marine. Of the actual workings of this law there has really 
been no fair test, as conditions which arose during the war un- 
settled the entire shipping situation. 

The domestic program of the first year and a half of the Wilson 
Administration comprised, then a long-needed and immeasurably 
valuable reform of the banking and currency system, a revised 
tariff, which was at least a technical victory for Democratic 
principles, and a number of minor measures which seem less 
important in. retrospect than they did at the time. The program 
neither completely unshackled business nor opened the door to a ^ 
new era of cooperation and human brotherhood, but it was a 
large and on the whole decidedly creditable accomplishment, and 
it was above all the work of President Wilson, who had led the 
fight that carried the Administration measures through Congress, 
quite as any Prime Minister might have done. He had not done 
it without exposing himself to severe criticism. Ex-Senator Win- 



21 



throp Murray Crane, for example, declared that he had "virtually 
obliterated Congress." But he had got most of what he wanted, 
and by the end ot his first year in office Mr. Br>'an was no longer 
the most powerful individual in the Democratic Party.' 

Foreign T'o/icies, igij-igi4 

/N The North American Review for March, 191J, edited by 
Colonel George Harvey, the original Wilson man, who had 
mentioned Wilson as a Presidential possibility back in 1904, 
when such a suggestion was regarded as only a playful eccen- 
tricity, who had begun to work hard for him in 191 1, and who had 
finally been asked by Wilson himself to give up his activity be- 
cause the connection of one of Harvey's magazines with J. P. 
Morgan & Co. was hurting \Mlson in the West — there appeared 
an article entitled "Jefferson — Wilson: A Record and a Forecast." 
It consisted of eight pages of quotations from Wilson's "History 
of the American People," dealing with the beginning of Jefferson's 
Administration. The reader's attention was arrested by the 
startling parallel between the division in the Federalist Party and 
the quarrel between Hamilton and Adams that facilitated Jeffer- 
son's election, and the situation which led to W'ilson's victory in 
November, 1912. Wilson, writing a dozen years before the fight 
between Taft and Roosevelt, had unconsciously drawn a parallel 
closer perhaps than the facts warranted; and the reader who had 
been attracted by this similarity read on into Wilson's characteri- 
zation of Jefferson an introduction to the achievements of his 
Administration with a growing hope — if he happened to be a 
Wilson man — that after as before election Wilson's record would 
duplicate Jefferson's. 

Colonel Harvey was as good a prophet in 1913 as in 1904. 
Wilson's achievement in domestic affairs in the first year of his 
Administration was not likely to suffer much by comparison with 
Jefferson's. But it could not have crossed anybody's mind in 
March, 1913, that complications of international politics such as 
had almost ruined the country under Jefferson would in the latter 
part of Wilson's first term expose him to as much criticism as 
Jefferson, and for the same reasons. 

America was still new as a worid power, but was beginning to 
feel more at home. In Taft's Administration, with Philander C. 
Knox as Secretaj-y of State, there haci been for the first time the 
beginnings of what might fairly be called a consistent foreign 
policy. True, it was not a very lofty policy, nor was it by any 
means generally approved in America. It was called by its 
friends "dollar diplomacy," meaning the promotion of American 
commercial interests by diplomatic agencies. It had been ex- 
emplified principally in Central America, where its operations 

22 



/ 



Landmarks in Wilson's Mexican Policy 

Program for armistice aiid eUi lions to end civil war, August ^ 

19^3- 
'' IVatchful waiting,'' /g/j-14. 
Capture of Fera Cruz, April 2/, /(j/4. 
A B C mediation, April 2^, ^9^4- 
Flight of Huerta, July, 191 4. 
Recognition of Carranza, September, igif^. 
Villa s raid on Columbus and Pershing s expedition into 

Mexico, March, Ii)i6. 
Flight and death of Carranza, Ma\ , n)20. 



had nut always conimaiided admiration, and in China, where 
Knox had made a well-intentioned but not very skillful effort to 
prevent the absorption of iManchuria by Russia and Japan. 

/However ]^rimitive this organization of foreign policy, none the 
less Taft and Knox had taken a great step forward in the 
improvement of American diplomatic machinery. The ciiplc- 
matic service and the State Department were beginning to be 
regarded as two parts of the same agency, and for the first time 
diplomacy had begun to be a career with possibilities. The 
practice of promoting able young secretaries to chiefs of legation, 
begun by Roosevelt, haci been widely extended by Taft; and 
though the highest posts were still filled by wealthy amateurs it 
seemed that at last the American diplomatic service offered some 
attraction to an ambitious man. It was the general expectation 
in Europe and still more in America that President Wilson, who 
by training and inclination might be expected to approve of the 
elevation of standards in the diplomatic service, would continue 
and extend this work. Instead of that, he undid it, or rather per- 
mitted it to be undone. 

Mr. Bryan had of necessity been made Secretary of State, and 
it may be supposed that there was equal necessity for opening up 
the diplomatic service as a happy hunting ground for the Bryan 
men — "deserving Democrats," as Mr. Bryan called them in a 
famous letter. The chief European posts, to which the Taft 
Administration had not begun to apply the merit system, were 
filled chiefly by Mr. Wilson's own nominees. These included 
several well-known men of letters, and with one or two exceptions 
the amateur diplomats serving as the heads of the missions in 
Europe did satisfactory and even brilliant service under the un- 
precedented strain which the war brought on them. The service 
in Latin xAmerica, however, which Knox had almost entirely 

23 



professionalized, was given over bodily to personal followers of 
Bryan. In what was in 1913 perhaps the most important of our 
diplomatic posts, the embassy to Mexico, Mr. Wilson was com- 
pelled to rely provisionally on Henry Lane Wilson, a holdover 
appointee from the previous Administration. 

It was soon made clear that there was to be no more dollar 
^ diplomacy. The Knox policies in Central x'\merica were dropped — 
although American troops continued to dominate Nicaragua — 
and in 1914 the Administration successfully discouraged American 
participation in a six-power loan to China. The Russo-Japanese 
absorption of Manchuria was to be treated as the accomplished 
fact that it was; and in general the policy of the new Adminis- 
tration was anything but aggressive. It would not use diplomacy 
to advance American commercial interests, nor was it prepared to 
accept the assistance ot American financiers in promoting the 
policies of diplomacy. 

But it was evident from the outset that the most quiescent 
foreign policy could not prevent foreign complications. Growing 
anti-Japanese sentiment in California led to the passage of a State 
law against Japanese land holdings. There was much resentment 
in Japan, and protest was made to the Federal Government. Mr. 
Bryan, as Secretary of State, had to make a personal trip to 
Sacramento to intercede with the Californians; and at one time 
(May, 1913) military men appeared to feel that the situation was 
extremely delicate. But the crisis passed over, the Californians 
modified the law, and though in its amended form it suited neither 
the Californians nor the Japanese, the issue remained in the back- 
ground during the more urgent years of the war. Toward the 
very end of the Wilson Administration it was to come back into 
prominence. 

Another question which caused much disturbance to the new 
Administration was the question of Panama Canal tolls. An act 
passed in 1912 had exempted American coastwise shipping passing 
through the canal from the tolls assessed on other vessels, and the 
British Government had protested against this on the ground that 
it violated the Hay-Pauncefote treaty of 1901, which had stipu- 
lated that the canal should be open to the vessels of all nations "on 
terms of entire equality." Other nations than England had an 
interest in this question, and there was a suspicion that some of 
them were even more keenly if not more heavily interested; but 
England took the initiative and the struggle to save the exemption 
was turned, in the United States, into a demonstration by the 
Irish, Germans and other anti-British elements. Innate hostility 
to England, the coastwise shipping interests, formed the back- 
bone of the opposition to any repeal of this exemption, but the 
Taft Administration had held that the exemption did not conflict 
with the treaty (on the ground that the words "all nations" 
meant all nations except the United States), and British oppo- 

24 



sition to the fortification of the canal, as well as the attitude of a 
section of the British press during the Canadian elections of 191 1, 
had created a distrust of British motives which was heightened 
by the conviction of many that the Hay-Pauncefote treaty had 
been a bad bargain. 

It was understood early in President Wilson's Administration 
that he believed the exemption was in violation of the treaty, 
but not until October did he make formal announcernent that he 
intended to ask Congress to repeal it. The question did not 
come into the foreground, however, until March 5, 1914, when the 
President addressed this request to Congress in ominous language, 
which to this day remains unexplained. "No communication I 
addressed to Congress," he said, "has carried with it more grave 
and far-reaching "implications to the interests of the country." 
After expressing his belief that the law as it stood violated the 
treaty and should be repealed as a point of honor, he continued: 
"I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Ad- 
ministration. I shall not know how to deal with other matters 
of even greater delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not 
grant it to me in ungrudging measure." 

It has been most plausibly suggested that this obscure language 
had reference to the Mexican situation, which a few weeks 
later was to lead to the occupation of Vera Cruz. The European 
powers were known to be much displeased at the continuing dis- 
turbances in Mexico and the American policy of "watchful 
waiting," and the belief has been expressed that repeal of the 
exemption was a step to get British support for continued for- 
bearance with Mexico. Other critics have seen a reference to the 
unsettled issues with Japan and a fear that England might give 
more aggressive support to her ally if the tolls question were left 
unsettled. The attempt of a writer of biography to maintain 
that even in March, 1914, the President and Colonel House fore- 
saw the European war and wanted to arrange our own inter- 
national relations by way of precaution has been generally 
received with polite skepticism. 

At any rate, the President's intervention in the question, against 
the advice of his most trusted political counselors, brought down 
on him a shower of personal abuse from Irish organs and from 
the group of newspapers which presently were to appear as the 
chief supporters of Germany. The arguments against the repeal 
were unusually bitter, and even though Elihu Root took his 
stand beside the President and against the recent Republican 
Administration, partisan criticism seized upon the opening. 
Nevertheless the tolls exemption was repealed in June, and events 
of July and August gave a certain satisfaction to those who had 
stood for the sanctity of treaties. 

As a part of what might be called the general deflation of over- 
seas entanglements, the new Administration brought about a 

25 



material change in the treatment of the Philippines. From the 
beginning great changes were made in the personnel of the Philip- 
pines Commission and of the Administration of the country. 
Many American officials were replaced by Filipinos, but the 
separatist agitation in the islancis was not much allayed by the 
extension of self-government. In October, 1914, the Jones Bill, 
which practically promised independence "as soon as a stable 
government shall ha\'e been established," was passed by the House 
of Representatives, but Republican opposition was strengthened 
by those who remembered Bryan's anti-imperialism in 1900 and 
by the supporters of a strong policy in the Pacific. This issue, like 
others of the early period, came back into greater prominence in 
the last years of the second Wilson Administration, when war 
i ssues were temporarily disposed of. 
/ A specially conciliatory policy toward Latin America was one 
of the chief characteristics ot the early period of the Administra- 
tion. At the Southern Commercial Congress in Mobile, on 
October 27, 1913, the President declared that "the United States 
will never seek one additional foot of territory by conquest;" 
a statement which was understood in direct relation to the demand 
for intervention in Mexico, and which had a very considerable 
effect on public sentiment in Central and South America. The 
passing of "dollar diplomacy," too, was generally satisfactory to 
Latin America, and, though Mr. Bryan's inexperienced diplomats 
made a good many blunders and could not help, as a rule, being 
compared unfavorably with the professionals who had held the 
Latin-American posts in the previous Administration, the general 
policy of Wilson created much more confidence in the other two 
Americas than did the spasmodic aggressiveness of Roosevelt or 
the commercialized diplomacy of Taft. 

One specific attempt was made to heal a sore spot left by Roose- 
velt in relations with Latin America by the new Administration. 
Negotiations with Colombia to clear up the strained situation 
left by the revolution in Panama had been under way in the Taft 
Administration, but had come to nothing. Ihider Wilson they 
were resumed, and on April 7, 1914, a treaty was signed by which 
the United States was to pay to Colombia a compensation of 
$25,000,000 for Colombian interests in the Isthmus. The treaty 
further containeci a declaration that the Government of the 
United States expressed its "sincere regret for anything that may 
have happened to ilisturb the relations" between the. two coun- 
tries, and this suggestion of an apology for Roosevelt's action in 
1903 roused the violent hostility of Republicans and Progressives. 
The opposition was so strong that in spite of repeated efforts the 
Administration could never get the treaty ratified by the Senate; 
but the undoubtedly sincere efforts of the Executive had of 
themselves a considerable effect in mollifying the suspicions of 
Latin America. 

26 



But all problems south of the Isthmus were insignificant com- 
pared with the difficulties in Mexico which had begun with the 
Madero Revolution against Diaz in 1910. Just at the close of the 
Tatt Administration Madero had been overthrown and killed by 
Huerta, who then ruled in Mexico City and was recognized|by 
England and Germany in the Spring of 1913. Villa and Carranza 
were in arms against Huerta in the north, calling themselves the 
champions of the Constitution; Orozoco and Zapata were in arms 
against everybody in the south; foreign lite and property were 
unsafe everywhere except in the largest cities. The demand for 
intervention, which had been strong ever since the troubles began, 
was increasing in 1913. Huerta professed to be holding office only 
until a peaceful election could determine the will of the nation, 
hut the date of that peaceful election had to be constantly put 
off. The embargo on shipments of arms from the United States 
still existed, preventing Huerta from supplying his troops; but 
there was a good deal of smuggling to the revolutionary armies in 
the north. Of the interventionists some wanted intervention 
against Huerta and some wanted intervention for Huerta; and the 
pressure of economic interests in Mexico was complicating all 
phases of the situation. 

From the first President ^^'ilson had expressed his disapproval 
of the methods by which Huerta had attained office, x^mbassador 
Wilson, on the other hand, thought that Huerta ought to be 
supported, and when his policy did not commend itself to the 
President he res'gned in August, 1913. But already the President 
had been getting nformation about Mexico from extra-official 
sources. His first envoy was William Bayard Hale, author of 
one of his campaign biographies. Ambassador Wilson was vir- 
tually replaced in August by another special representative, John 
Lind, who carried to Huerta the proposals of President Wilson 
for solution of the Mexican problem. They included a definite 
armistice, a general election in which Huerta should not be a 
candidate, and the agreement of all parties to obey the Govern- 
ment chosen by this election, which would be recognized by the 
United States. Huerta refused and presently dissolved Congress. 
When the elections were finally held on October 1 Huerta won, 
and there was no doubt that he would have won no matter how 
the voting had happened to go. 

The President's program for Mexican reform, it may be said, 
was not as evidently impracticable in 1913 as it seems in ret- 
rospect. It was widely criticised at the time, and the phrase 
"watchful waiting" which he invented as a description of his 
Mexican Policy was made the object of much ridicule. Through- 
out the first winter of the new Administration the American 
Government was apparently waiting for something to happen to 
Huerta or for Huerta to reform, and President Wilson several 
times sharply criticised the actions of the Mexican dictator. But 

27 



Huerta did not reform and nothing sufficient happened to him; 
it began to look as if watchful waiting might continue indefinitely 
when a trivial incident furnished the last straw. 

A boatload of American sailors from the warships anchored 
off Tampico to protect American citizens had been arrested by 
the Mexican military authorities. They were released, with 
apologies, but Admiral Mayo demanded a salute to the American 
flag by way of additional amends, and when Huerta showed a 
disposition to argue the matter the Atlantic Fleet was (April 14, 
1914) ordered to Mexican waters. A week later, as negotiations 
had failed to produce the salute, the President asked Congress to 
give him authority to use the armed forces of the United States 
"against Victoriano Huerta." There was much criticism of the 
policy which had endured serious material injuries for more than 
a year to threaten force at last because of a technical point of 
honor, and besides those who did not want war at all the President 
found himself opposed by many Congressmen who thought that 
the personal attack on Huerta was rather undignified, and that 
the President shoulci have asked for a downright declaration of war. 

■While Congress was debating the resolution the American 
naval forces (on April 21) seized the Vera Cruz Custom House to 
prevent the landing of a munition cargo from a German ship. 
This led to sharp fighting and the occupation of the entire city 
General Funston with a division of regulars was sent to relieve 
the naval landing parties; and war seemed inevitable. Even the 
Mexican revolutionaries showed a tendency to prefer Huerta to 
the intervention of the United States. But on April 25 the Govern- 
ments of Argentina, Brazil and Chile proposed mediation, which 
Wilson and Huerta promptly accepted. A conference met at 
Niagara Falls, Ontario, and through May and June endeavored 
to reach a settlement not only between the United States and 
Mexico, but between the various Mexican factions. The Presi- 
dent was still attempting to carry out his policy of August, 1913, 
and the chief obstacle was not Huerta, but Carranza, who had 
refused to consent to an armistice and for a long time would not 
send delegates to Niagara Falls. Meanwhile Huerta made one 
concession after another. Watchful waiting had indeed ruined 
him; for President Wilson's opposition had made it impossible 
for him to get any money in Europe — and in the early part of 
1914 some European nations would still have considered Mexico 
a good risk. Moreover, from February to April the embargo on 
arms had been lifted, and the Constitutionalists armies in the 
north, munitioned from the United States, were steadily con- 
quering the country. On July 15 Huerta resigned, and soon after- 
ward sailed for Spain; and on August 20 Carranza entered Mexico 
City. 

Despite the criticism that had been heaped on the President's 
handling of the Tampico-Vera Cruz affair, he had got rid of 

28 



Huerta without getting into war A still more important con- 
sequence, the full effect of which was not immediately apparent, 
was the enormous increase in the confidence felt by Latin America 
in the good intentions of the Wilson Administration, The ac- 
ceptance of A-B-C mediation in 1914 made possible the entry ot 
most of the Latin-American powers into the European War in 
1917 as allies of the United States. And for a time it was to appear 
as if this had been about the only tangible profit of the episode; 
for Carranza presently proved almost as troublesome as Huerta. 
The Fall of 1914 saw the outbreak of a new civil war between 
Villa and Carranza, in which Zapata, Villa's ally, for a long time 
held Mexico City. Obregon's victories in 1915 drove Villa back 
to his old hunting grounds. 

By this time the European war was occupying most of the 
attention of the American people, but Mexico was a constant 
irritant. Carranza carried the Presidential art of biting the hand 
that fed him to an undreamed-of height. Wilson, Villa and 
Obregon had enabled him to displace Huerta, and Obregon had 
saved him from Villa. Yet he had quarreled with Villa, he was 
eventually to quarrel with Obregon; and though the United States 
and the chief Latin-American powers had given him formal 
recognition in September, 191 5, his policy toward Wilson con- 
tinued to be blended of insult and obstruction. Henry Prather 
Fletcher, the ablest of the diplomats accredited to Latin-American 
capitals, had been called back from Santiago de Chile to represent 
the United States in Mexico; but despite his skill, despite the 
infinite forbearance of the Administration, Mexico sank deeper 
and deeper into misery, foreign lives and property were unsafe 
throughout most of the country, and there was a continuing 
succession of incidents on the border. 

These were the fault of bandits, chiefly of Villa, whose repeated 
murders of American citizens led to futile attempts to get satis- 
faction out of Carranza, The culmination of these outrages came 
on March 9, 1916, when Villa raided across the border, surprised 
the garrison of Columbus, N. M., and killed some twenty Ameri- 
cans. A punitive expedition of regulars under General Pershing 
was promptly organized. It pushed about 200 miles into Mexico, 
destroyed several small parties of Villistas, and wounded Villa 
himself. But it did not catch him nor any of his principal leaders, 
and in April outlying parties of Americans came into skirmishing 
with Carranza forces at Parral and Carrizal. It was evident that 
further advance meant war with Carranza; and indeed much 
American sentiment aroused by the capture of American soldiers 
by Carranzistas, demanded war already. But relations with 
Germany were very acute at the moment, so Pershing dug in and 
held his position throughout the Summer and Fall. In May the 
National Guard was ordered out to protect the border, and re- 
mained in position for months without taking active steps. 

29 



President Wilson's Appeals for Mediation 

For))ial offer of })ic(iiat'u)>i to all belligcroits .lugnst 5, n)i 4. 
German proposal of peace conference^ December /2, jgi6. 
President' s appeal to the belligerents to state their teyms^ Decem- 
ber iS, igi6. 
German refusal to state terms, December 26, igi6. 
Allied statement of war aims, January 11, igi/. 
President's ''peace without victory" speech, January 22, igi". 
Notification of unrestricted submarine war, January j/, igij. 
Diplomatic relations with Germany broken, February j, /p//. 
Declaratio)! (f war, April 6, igf/. 



/The Mexican policy ot the Administration was one of the chief 
points of attack during the campaign of 1916, but the re-election 
of President Wilson and the progress of events in Fairope presently 
threw the issue into the background. In February and March, 
1 91 7, when war with Germany seemed inevitable, the expedition- 
a-y force under Pershing was r.'called / 

Carranza's pro-Germanism, or rather anti-Americanism, was 
hardly disguised during the war, and the confiscatory policy of 
his Administration in dealing with foreign oil and mineral prop- 
erties threatened to do much damage to American interests. 
When the war in pAU-ope had ended, the question of Mexico once 
more came back to the foreground of attention. Carranza's Ad- 
ministration had not been stained by so much guilt as Huerta's, 
and the opposition to it was on the scale of banditry rather than 
revolution; but Mexico was far worse off after years of the war 
than it had been in 1913, and disregard of American rights was 
still the cardinal policy of the Government. Carranza's security, 
however, was illusory. In the Spring of 1920 Presidential elec- 
tions were announced at last, and Carranza'a attempt to force 
Ygnacio Bonillas, his Ambassad(jr in Washington, into the Presi- 
dential chair led to a revolt which eventually attracted the leader- 
ship of Obregon. Carranza fled from Mexico City and was murdered 
on May 21, 1920, and, after the interim Presidency of Adolfo de 
la Huerta, Obregon came into office in the Fall. 



T/ie tnropeitu IVur, igi^-igid 

HEN in the last week of July, 1914, a war of unparalleled 
intensity and magnitude sudcienly fell upon a world which 
for forty years had been enjoying unprecedented well-being 
and security, the practically unanimous sentiment of Americans 
was gratitude that we were not involved. The President's first 

30 



IV. 




PTua 



Federal ^serve 

WE must have a currency, not rigid 
as now, but readily, elastically 
responsive to sound credit, the ex- 
panding and contracting credits of 
everyday transactions, the normal ebb 
and flow of personal and corporate 
dealings. Our banking laws must 
mobilize reserves; must not permit the 
concentration anywhere in a few hands 
of the monetary resources of the coun- 
try or their use for speculative pur- 
poses in such volume as to hinder or 
impede or stand in the way of other 
more legitimate, more fruitful uses. — 
From the President's Address to Con- 
gress^ April 23, 191 3. 



MJjm iii i i i i ii ii i i n ii ii i i iii iiiiiin ii iiHi miiiiiiiiiiiinniiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiimiimoii 



biiiniii[ni!i[ni' 



IT 





July 3, 1912: Governor \V;i^ • • <-'""rtesy New York rimes 

corre^Z ems o T-' """''"' '^°"^-^"'^^-- ^-n, newspaper 
e. pendents on h,s nomination for the Presidency 



steps, a formal proclamation of neutrality and equally formal tender 
of mediation to the belligerents, "either now or at any other 
lime that might be thought more suitable," had general approval. 
But a sharp division of sentiment showed itself when, on August 
1 8, he issued an address to the American people warning against 
partisan sympathies and asking that Americans be "impartial m/^ 
thought as well as in action," in order that the country might be 
"neutral i > tact as well as in name." The great majority of the 
^ American people, or of such part of it as held opinions on public 
questions, had already made up their minds about the war, and 
most of the others were in process of being convinced. Some of 
them had made up their mintls from racial sympathies, but others 
had thought things out. And among these last, particularly, 
there was a revolt against the assumption that in the presence of 
such issues any impartiality of thought was possible. 
,.^i. Moreover, the world-wide extent of the war, and the closer 
'^ter-relations of nations which had grown up in recent years, 
n^de almost from the first a series of conflicts between the in- 
terests of the United States and those of one or the other set of 
belligerents. Preservation of neutrality against continual petty 
m fractions was hard, and was rendered harder by the active 
sympathy felt for the different belligerents by many Americans. 
A further complication came from the growing feeling that Amer- 
ica's military and naval forces were far from adequate for pro- 
tection in a world where war was after all possible. The Autumn 
of 1914 saw the beginningfor better national preparedness, and 
f counter to that the rise of organized peace-at-any-price sentiment 
which from the first drew much support from pro-German circles. 
The President appeared to incline toward the pacifists. He 
called the discussion of preparedness "good mental exercise," 
and referred to some of its advocates as "nervous and excitable," 
and in the message to Congress in December, 1914, he took the 
petition that American armaments were quite sufficient for 
American needs. In this it was apparent that he was opposed by 
a large part of the x'\merican people; how large no one could yet 
say. But the Congressional elections of 1914 had conveyed a 
warning to the Democrats. They were left with a majority in 
both houses, but the huge preponderance obtained in 191 2 had 
disappeared. And the reason was even more alarming than the 
fact; the Progressive Party almost faded off the map in the 
election of 1914. Most of the voters who had been Republicans 
before the Chicago Convention of 1912 were Republicans once 
again. Of the Progressive Party, there was nothing much left but 
the leaders, and many of these were obviously thinking of going 
back to the old home. 

The Government had already had occasion to protest against 
British interference with allied commerce when, on February 4, 
191 s, the Germans proclaimed the waters about the British Isles 

33 



a war zone open to submarine activities. The President promptly 
warned the German Government that it would be held to "strict 
accountability" if American ships were sunk or American lives 
lost in the submarine campaign. Along with this a message was 
sent to the British Government protesting against British restric- 
tion of neutral commerce. There was good ground for objection 
to the practices of both Governments, and the simultaneous 
protests emphasized the neutral attitude of the United States. 
Not until later was it evident that to the Germans this policy 
seemed to indicate the possibility of putting pressure on England 
through America. 

"Strict accountability" seemed to be a popular watchword, 
except among pacifists and German sympathizers, but Americans 
soon began to be killed by the submarines without provoking the 
Government to action. When the Lusitania was sunk on May 7, 
191 5, and more than a hundred of the 1,200 victims were Americans 
a great part of the nation which had been growing steadily more 
exasperated felt that now the issue must be faced. The President 
was the personal conductor of the foreign policy of the Adminis- 
tration; Mr. Bryan's sole interest in foreign affairs seemed to be 
the conclusion of a large number of polite and valueless treaties 
of arbitration, and it was certain that with Germany, as with 
Mexico, the President would deal in person. In the few days 
after the sinking of the Lusitania the nation waited confidently 
for the President's leadership, and public sentiment was perhaps 
more nearly unanimous than it had been for eight months past, 
or was to be again for two years more. 

The President's note on May 13 met with general approval. 
It denied any justification for such acts as the sinking of the 
Lusitania, and warned the Germans that the Government of the 
LInited States would not "omit any word or act" to defend the 
rights of its citizens. But some of the effect of that declaration 
had already been destroyed by a speech the President had made 
two days before, in which he had said that "there is such a thing 
as a man being too proud to fight," and the Germans, it was 
learned presently, had been still further reassured by a declaration 
of Mr. Bryan (entirely on his own authority) to the Austrian 
Ambassador that the note was intended only for home con- 
sumption. 

At any rate, the note was not followed by action. Throughout 
the whole Summer the President maintained a correspondence 
with the Germans, distinguished by patient reasoning on his part 
and continual shiftings and equivocations on theirs. Meanwhile 
nothing was done; the public sentiment of the first days after the 
Lusitania had been sunk had slackened; division and dissension 
had returned and redoubled. Pacifism was more active than ever 
and German agents were spreading propaganda and setting fire 
and explosives to munition plants. Mr. Bryan, who apparently 

34 , 



alone in the country was fearful that the President might need- 
lessly involve the nation in war, resigned as Secretary of State on 
June 8. Aside from a certain relief, the public almost ignored his 
passing; the man who had been the strongest leader of the party 
in March, 1913, had in the last two years sunk almost into ob- 
scurity. Attention was now concentrated on the policy which 
the President, whose new Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, 
was hardly more than a figurehead, was pursuing toward Germany. 

In August two more American passengers were drowned in the 
sinking of the liner Arabic, and in other submarine exploits of 
the Summer a number of American seamen lost their lives. The 
President's persistence at last had the effect of getting from the Ger- 
mans, on September i, a promise to sink no more passenger boats, 
and on October 5 they made a formal expression of regret for the 
Arabic incident. Meanwhile some of the acts of sabotage against 
American industries had been traced back to the Austro-Hun- 
garian Embassy, and the Ambassador, Dr. Dumba, was sent home 
in September. A few months later Papen and Boy-Ed, the 
Military and Naval Attaches of the German Embassy, followed 
him for a similar reason. 

But the German outrages continued, and so did the submarine 
sinkings, though these were now transferred to the Mediterranean 
and Austria was put forward as the guilty power. Also, nothing 
had been done about the Lusitania. The country had apparently 
been divided by internal discords. The condition which the 
President had hoped to prevent by his appeal for "impartiality 
in thought as well as in action" had come about. Also, the 
danger of war had revealed the inadequacy of America's military 
establishment, and a private organization, whose moving spirit 
was General Leonard Wood, had undertaken to supply the de- 
ficiencies of the Government by establishing officers' training 
camps. Toward Wood and his enterprise the Government seemed 
cold, and he was reprimanded by the Secretary of War for per- 
mitting Colonel Roosevelt to make an indiscreet speech at the 
training camp at Plattsburg. But when Congress assembled in 
December the President deplored and denounced that new appear- 
ance in American public life, the hyphenate, and urged upon 
Congress that military preparation which he had derided a year 
before. 

Congress, it was soon evident, was far less convinced than the /^ 
President that anything had happened during 191 5. In December, 
191 5, and in January, 1916, Mr. Wilson made a speaking tour 
through the East and Middle West in support of his new policy. 
His demand for a navy "incomparably the most adequate in the 
world," which Mr. Daniels translated into the biggest navy in the 
world, aroused some doubts in the minds of the public as to where 
the Administration thought the chief danger lay, and German 
influences did their best during the Winter to stir up anti-British 

35 



sentiment in Congress — the more easily since the controversy over 
British interference with American commerce was still unsettled. 
Eventually, and largely as a result of the President's speaking 
tour, Congress adopted a huge naval program, which was destined 
to remain on paper for some years. Military reform, however, 
had a different fate. The President had supported the policy 
favored by the Secretary of War, Lindley M. Garrison, of supple- 
menting the regular line by a federalized "Continental army" ot 
400,000 men. The House Committee on Military Affairs, led by 
James Hay, would not hear of this and insisted on Federal aid to 



Senator Glass on Woodrow Wilson 

It is }}i\ considered judgment that Woodrow IVilson will take a 
place in history among the very foremost of the great men who 
have given direction to the fortunes of the }iatio>i. No President 
of the United States^ from the beginni}ig of the Republic^ ever 
excelled him in essential preparatioti for the tasks of the office. 
By a thorough acquisition of abstract knowledge, by clear and 
convincing precept and by a firm and diligent practical applica- 
tiori of the outstanding principles of statecraft, no occupant of 
the Executive chair up to his advent was better furnished for a 
notable administration of public affairs. And Wilson s Ad- 
ministration has been notable. Its achievements, in enumera- 
tion and importance, have never been surpassed; and it may 
accurately be said that most of the things accomplished were of 
the President's own initiative. 

Of the President's personal traits and characteristics I can)iot 
as confidently speak as those persons whose constant and inti- 
mate association with him has giveii them observatioJi of his 
moods and habits. To me he always has been the soul of 
courtesy and frankness. Dignified, but reasonably familiar; 
tenacious when sure of his position, but )iot hard to persuade or 
to convince in a cause having )}icrit, I have good reason to be 
incredulous when I hear persons gabble about the unwillingness 
of President Wilso7i to seek counsel or accept advice. For a 
really great man who must be measurably conscious of his own 
intellectual power, he has repeatedly done both things in an 
astonishing degree during his Administration; and when cer- 
tain of a mans downright honesty, I have never known any- 
body who could be readier to confide serious matters implicitly 
to a coadjutor in the public service. 

CARTER GLASS 
Written for The New York Tinws, 
February iS, IQ21. 



36 



the National Guard. The President, declaring that he could not 
tell a Congressional committee that it must take his plan or none, 
appeared to be ready to give in to Hay, and Garrison resigned in 
protest. Hay had his way, and Garrison was succeeded by Newton 
D. Baker, previously regarded as inclined to the pacifist side of 
the controversy./ 

Meanwhile the submarine issue was still an issue. Little satis- 
faction had been obtained for events in the Mediterranean, and in 
March the Sussex, a cross-Channel passenger boat, was torpedoed 
in plain violation of the German promise of September i. There 
followed another interchange of notes, but the usual German 
efforts to deny and evade were somewhat more clumsy than usual. 
On April 19 the President came before Congress and announced 
that "unless the Imperial Government should now immediately 
declare and effect an abandonment of its present methods ot 
submarine warfare against passenger and freight carrying vessels" 
diplomatic relations would be broken off". The threat had its 
effect; the Germans yielded, grudgingly and in language that 
aroused much irritation, but on the main question they yielded 
none the less, and promised to sink no more merchantmen with- 
out warning. 

During this crisis the President had had to contend with a 
serious revolt in Congress, which took the form of the Gore Resolu- 
tion in the Senate and the McLemore resolution in the House, 
warning American citizens off armed merchantmen. The Presi- 
dent took the position that this was a surrender of American 
rights, and upon his insistence both resolutions were brought to a 
vote and defeated. The Lusitania question was still unsettleci, 
but on the general issue of submarine war the Germans had at 
last given way to the President's demand, and through Jiiost of 
1 91 6 the submarine issue was in the background. 

During the year there was a continuation of diplomatic action 
against the British Government's interference with neutral com- 
merce and with neutral mails. But, aside from the comparative 
unimportance of these issues beside the submarine assassinations, 
the Lusitania and similar episodes had stirred up so much indig- 
nation that not many Americans were seriously interested in 
action against England which could only work to the advantage 
of Germany. The year saw the institution of the Shipping Board, 
which was to look after the interests of the American merchant 
marine brought into being by the war. and also some efforts to 
extend American commerce in South America. Of more eventual 
importance for Latin-American relations was the necessity for 
virtually superseding the Government of the Dominican Republic, 
which had become involved in civil war and financial difficulties, 
by an American Naval Administration, as had been done in Haiti 
the year before. 

The principal domestic event of the year was the threatened 

37 



railroad strike, which came at the end of the Summer. The 
President summoned the heads of the four railroad brotherhoods 
and the executives of the railroad lines to Washington for a con- 
ference in August, and attempted without success to bring them 
to an agreement. A program to which he eventually gave his 
approval provided for the concession by the employers of the 
basic eight-hour day, with other issues left over until the working 
of this proposal could be studied. The railroad executives refused 
this, and while the negotiations were thus at a deadlock it became 
known that the brotherhoods had secretly ordered a strike begin- 
ning September 4. To avert this crisis the President asked Con- 
gress to pass a series of laws accepting the basic eight-hour day, 
providing for a commission of investigation, and forbidding further 
strikes pending Government inquiry. 

None oi these proposals except the eight-hour dav, the center 
of the whole dispute, met the approval of the brotherhoods, and 
none of them except the eight-hour day and the commission of 
investigation was adopted. But, with A. B. Garreston, of the / 
Brotherhood of Conductors, holding a stopwatch in the galleryTf^ 
Congress hastily passed these laws and the strike was called off. 

The eight-hour issue was the last item on the record on which 
President Wilson came up for re-election in the Fall of 191 6. 
Despite the single-term plank in the Democratic platform of 

191 2, it had been evident long before the end of Mr. Wilson's 
first term that he was the only possible candidate. In March, 

1913, he had seemed almost like an outside expert called in for 
temporary service in readjusting some of the problems of public 
life; he was by no means the leader of the party. But long before 
Bryan resigned in alarm at the tendencies of a'foreign policy over 
which the Secretary of State had no control the President had be- 
come the leader of the party, and by 191 6 he was almost the only 
leader of prominence. 

In the record on which the electorate was to express its judg- 
ment only a minor place was taken by the issues which had 
seemed of such importance in 1913. The Federal Reserve Act 
had already proved its value so well that it was being taken as a 
matter of course, and people were forgetting that they had ever 
had to depend on a currency which ran for cover in every crisis 
and on a banking system where each bank was a source of weak- 
ness to its neighbors instead of strength. What effect the Under- 
wood-Simmons Tariff and other measures of the first year might 
have had on American business no man could say, for conditions 
created by the war had left America the only great producer in 
a world of impatient consumers whose wants had to be met at 
any price. 

Mexico, which had provided the most pressing problem in 
foreign affairs during the Taft Administration, was still an un- 
solved problem in 1916, and more disturbing than ever. The 

38 




Personal Messages to Congress 

IAiM very glad, indeed, to have this 
opportunity to address the two 
Houses directly and to verify for my- 
self the impression that the President 
of the United States is a person, not a 
mere department of the Government 
hailing Congress from some isolated 
island of jealous power, sending mes- 
sages, not speaking naturally and with 
his own voice — that he is a human 
being trying to cooperate with other 
human beings in a common service 
After this pleasant experience I shall 
feel quite normal in all cur dealings 
with one another. — From the Presidents 
First Address to Congress. April S, 1913 



President had indeed avoided war with Mexico, but had become 
involved in two invasions of the country and in an expensive 
mobilization. During the 1916 election the nation had in Mexico 
most of the drawbacks of war without any of the possible benefits. 
In forcing out Huerta the President had indeed won a notable 
diplomatic triumph, but he had not succeeded either in winning 
greater security for American life and property or in getting a 
Mexican Government more disposed to good relations with the 
United States; and the Republicans maintained that war had 
been avoided only at the sacrifice of both American prestige and 
American interests. 

But Mexico, despite the emphasis placed upon it by the Republi- 
cans, was a secondary issue in the campaign of^ 1916. The great 
issue was the conduct of American relations with Germany, and 
the ultimate Republican failure in the election may be laid pri- 
marily to the inability of the Republican Party to decide just 
where it stood on the main issue. 

The President had in this field also won a diplomatic victory. 
Like his victory over Huerta, it was more apparent than real, for 
the submarines were still active, and even during the campaign 
several incidents occurred which looked very much like 
violations of the German promise made in May. The most 
serious incident, that of the Lusitania, was still unsettled and the 
opponents of the President charged him with having bought peace 
with Germany, like peace with Mexico, at the cost of national 
interest and honor. Still the technical victory in the submarine 
negotiations had remained with the President, and he had suc- 
ceeded in winning at least a nominal recognition of American rights 
without going into a war which, as every one realized, would be a 
much more serious enterprise than an invasion of Mexico. German 
propaganda and terrorist outrages, which had been so serious in 
191 5, fell off materially in 191 6 largely on account of the energetic 
work of the Department of Justice, which had sent some of the 
most prominent conspirators to jail and driven others out of the 
country. But a considerable section of the population had made 
up its mind that Germany was already an enemy and was dis- 
satisfied with the President's continual efforts to preserve impar- 
tiality of thought as well as of action. 

The President was renominated at the Democratic Convention 
in St. Louis, and the platform expressed a blanket endorsement 
of the achievements of his Administration. But the chief incident 
of that convention was the keynote speech of Martin H. Glynn, 
which was based on the text, "He kept us out of war." His 
recital of the long list of past occasions in American history when 
foreign violations of American rights and injuries to American 
interests had not led to war was received with uproarious enthu- 
siasm by the convention and completely overturned the plans 
which had been made by the Administration managers to empha- 

41 



size the firmness of the President in defense of American rights. 

But the Republicans presently gave that issue back to them. 
The party passed over Colonel Roosevelt; the memory of 1912 
was still too bitter to permit the old-line leaders to accept him. 
On the other hand, the Colonel and his following had to be con- 
ciliated, so the Republican Convention nominated Charles E. 
Hughes, who had viewed the party conflict of 191 2 from the 
neutrality of the Supreme Court bench. The Progressive Party 
duly had its convention and nominated Roosevelt; and when 
Roosevelt announced that Hughes's views on the preservation of 
American interests were satisfactory and that the main ciuty was 
to beat Wilson, a good many Progressives followed the Colonel 
back into camp. A rump convention, however, nominated a Vice 
Presidential candidate, and virtually went over to Wilson. 

Justice Hughes's views on public issues were not known before 
he was nominated, and on the great issue of the campaign they 
were never very clearly known until after the election, when it 
was too late. He had strong opinions on Democratic misgovern- 
ment and maladministration and outspoken opinions on Mexico, 
but whenever he tried to say anything about the war in Europe,/ 
he used up most of his energy clearing his throat. A large element/^ 
in the American people, which was influential out of proportion 
to its numbers because it included most of the intelligent classes 
and most of the organs of public opinion, felt that the President 
had been too weak in the face of German provocation. To this 
element, chiefly in the East, Colonel Roosevelt appealed with his 
denunciation of German aggression and of the President's tem- 
porizing with Germany; but Colonel Roosevelt was not running 
for President. There was another minority, considerably smaller 
and far less reputable, which consisted of bitter partisans of the 
German cause. This minority was fiercely against the President 
because he had dared to challenge Germany at all; and though 
Mr. Hughes gave it no particular encouragement, it supported 
him because there was nobody else to support. 

So, in the Eastern States, where anti-German sentiment was 
strongest, the Democrats advocated the re-election ot Wilson as 
the defender of American rights against foreign aggression, 
while in the W^est he was praised as the man who had endured 
innumerable provocations and "kept us out of war." When 
Hughes swept everything in the East, it was confidently assumed 
on election night that Wilson had been repudiated by the country; 
but later reports showed that the East was no longer symptomatic 
of the country's sentiment. For three days the election was in 
doubt. It was finally decided by California, where the Republican 
Senator whom Hughes had snubbed was re-elected by 300,000 
majority, while the Democratic electoral ticket won by a narrow 
margin. Wilson had carried almost everything in the West. 

42 



Those parts of the country which lay further away from Europe 
and European interests had re-elected him because he had "kept 
us out of War." 

'iMediatiou Efforts, igi6-igij 

/T has been stated by Count von Bernstorff that, if Hughes 
had been elected, President \Mlson would immediately have 
resigned, along with the Vice President, after appointing 
Hughes as Secretary of State, in order to give the President-elect 
an opportunity to come into office at once and meet the urgent 
problems already pressing on the Executive. Whether the Presi- 
dent actually entertained any such intention or not, it would have 
been a logical development of his theory of the Chief Executive as 
Premier. But the President-Premier had received a vote of confi- 
dence, and was free to deal with the new situation created by the 
various peace proposals of the Winter of 1916-1917. The nego- 
tiations which followed during December and January were 
obscure at the time and are by no means '"lear even yet. The 
fullest account of them is that of Bernstorff, whose personal inter- 
est in vindirating himself would make him a somewhat unreliable 
witness even if there were nothing else against him. And at the 
time, when the President's motives were unknown to a public 
which had not his advantage of information as to what was going 
to happen in Europe, almost every step which he took was miscon- 
strued, and his occasional infelicities of language aroused suspi- 
cions which later events have shown to be entirely unjustified. 

Reports of American diplomats in the Fall of 1916 indicated 
that the party in Germany which favored unrestricted submarine 
war without consideration for neutrals was growing in strength. 
It was opposed by most of the civilian officials of the Government, 
mcluding the Chancellor, Bethmann Hollweg; Jagow and Zim- 
mermann, the successive Foreign Secretaries, and Bernstorff, the 
Ambassador in Washington. But the Admirals who supported it 
were gradually winning over the all-powerful Generals Hindenburg 
and Ludendorff, and it appeared only a question of time until the 
promise to x^merica of May, 191 6, should be broken. And, as 
Bernstorff has expressed it, the President realized after the Sussex 
note there could be no more notes; any future German aggression 
would have to be met by action or endured with meekness. 

In these circumstances the President was driven to seek oppor- 
tunity for the mediation which he had been ready to offer, if 
asked, from the very beginning of the war. But to offer mediation, 
so long as the war was undecided, was a matter of extreme delicacy. 
The majority of intelligent Americans were strong partisans ot 
the allied cause and firmly believed that that cause was bound to 
win in the long run. There was a minority which had equal sym- 
pathy for Germany and equal confidence in her ultimate success. 

43 



To offer mediation while the war was still undecided would have 
been to offend both of these elements, as well as the warring 
nations themselves, all of which were still confident of victory. 
Specifically, to ofi-'er mediation during the course of the Presi- 
dential election would have been to drive over to Hughes all the 
pro-Ally elements in America, which in the state of mind of 191 6 
would have seen in such a proposal only a helping hand extended 
to a Germany whose cause was otherwise hopeless. 

So, though during 191 6 the President would have welcomed a 
request for mediation, he did not dare suggest it on his own 
account. And neither side dared to propose it, for such a request 
would have been taken as an admission of defeat. Nineteen 
hundred and sixteen was an indecisive year, but the fortune of 
war gave now one side and now the other the conviction that a 
few months more would bring it to complete victory. In such 
circumstances the losers dared not make a proposal which would 
hearten their enemies and the victors would not suggest the stop- 
ping of the war when they hoped that a few months more would 
see them in a much more favorable position. 

But by December Germany's situation was more fortunate 
than at any time since the early Summer. Rumania, which had 
come into the war three months before, had been defeated and 
overrun in a spectacular campaign which had brought new pres- 



A Sympathetic Tribute 

Hamilton Hclt, head of a delegation that visited the White 
House on October 27, ig20y in connection with the campaign 
advocating our entry into the League of Nations^ said in the 
course of his address to President 7Vilso}i: 

''It was you who first focused the heterogeneous and oftoi 
diverse aims of the war on the one ideal of pure Americanism, 
which is democracy . It was you who suggested the basis on 
which peace was negotiated. It was you., more than any man, 
who translated into practical statesmanship the age-old dream 
of the poets, the prophets and the philosophers by setting up a 
league of nations to the end that cooperation could be sub- 
stituted for competition in international affairs. 

" These acts of statestnanship were undoubtedly the chief 
factors which brought about that victorious peace which has 
shorn Germany cf her power to subdue her neighbors, has co?r:- 
pelled her to make restitution for her crimes, has freed oppressed 
peoples, has restored ravaged territories, has created new democ- 
racies in the likeyiess of the United States, and above all has 
set up the League of Nations." 



44 



tige to the German armies The triumph was of more value in 
appearance than in reality, for no decision had been reached on 
the main fronts and none of the chief belligerents was willing to 
give up. Germany was under a terrible strain, and the civilian 
Government concluded that the end of 1916 offered an opportunity 
to make a peace proposal, without loss ot prestige, which might 
lead to a settlement of the war that would leave Germany sub- 
stantially the victor. For it was known that unless some such 
decisive result were soon attained the military party would un- 
loose the submarines in the effort to win a complete victory, and 
.thereby bring about complications too serious tor the civilian 
officials to contemplate with any sense ot security. 

So on Dec. 12 Bethmann Hollweg proposed a peace conference. 
He mentioned no terms which Germany would consider; he spoke 
in the arrogant tones of a victor; and the total effect of his speech 
was to convince the world that he was trying to influence the 
pacifist elements in the allied countries rather than to bring about 
an end of the war. But his step caused profound uneasiness in 
Washington, for he had anticipated the action which the President 
had long been considering. It Mr. Wilson could not have offered 
mediation before the election, he might have tried it in November 
had not the (ierman deportation ot Belgian workingmen just then 
aroused such a storm of anti-German feeling in America that it 
would have been unsafe to take a step which public opinion would 
have generally regarded as favorable to Germany. Now that 
Bethmann Hollweg had anticipated him, it was evident that any 
proposal which the President might make would be regarded as a 
sort of second to the German motion. 

Nevertheless, the situation was urgent, and the President seems 
to have felt that his interposition could perhaps accomplish some- 
thing which the German initiative could not. Colonel House in 
the last two years had made a number of trips to Europe as a sort 
of super-Ambassador to all the powers in the endeavor to find out 
what their Governments regarded as suitable terms of peace! 
Mr. Wilson's own interest lay first of all in the establishment of 
conditions that would reduce — or, as men would have said in 1916, 
prevent — the possibility of future wars. On May 27, 191 6, he 
had delivered a speech before the League to Enforce Peace in 
which he favored the formation of an international association 
for the delay or prevention of wars and the preservation of the 
freedom of the seas. Later speeches contained doctrines most of 
which were eventually written into the League covenant, and were 
based on the central theory that all nations must act together to 
prevent the next war, as otherwise they would all be drawn into it. 
On Oct. 26 he had declared that "this is the last war the United 
States can ever keep out of." 

Yet the President also had ideas on the nature of the peace 
terms by which the war then going on should be conclucied, 

45 



The United States in the War 

Declaration of zvar, April 6, 191/. 

American warships in European waters, May 4, 1917- 

First Libert} Loan offeren, May 14, 1917- 

Selective Service act operative, May iS, 1917. 

First American troops in France, July i , 19 17. 

Fourteen Points speech, January 8, 191S. 

'''Force to the utmost'' speech, April 6, 191 8. 

Americans in action at Cantigny, May 28, 1918. 

Chateau-Thierry , June /-j, 1918. 

Marne-Aisne offensive, July i ^-August, 1918. 

St. Mihiel offensive, September 12, 191 8. 

Meuse-Argonne offensive, September 26-November 11, 1918. 

Austrian peace proposal, September /j, 1918. 

First German peace note, October 4, 1918. 

Armistice ending the war, November 11, 1918. 



though he felt that no good could be obtained by the proposal of 
such terms from a neutral. On Dec. 18, accordingly, he addressed 
the belligerent Governments with an invitation to state the spe- 
cific conditions which each ot them regarded as essential to a just 
peace, in the hope that they would find they were nearer agree- 
ment than they knew. Unfortunately, the President lade the 
observation that the objects ot the two alliances, "as stated in 
general terms to their own people and the world," were "virtually 
the same." That was true; each side had said that it was fightinj 
in self-defense in order to preserve international justice, the right 
of nationalities, and a number of other worthy interests. But the 
.public, both in America and in the allied countries, saw in this 
renewed effort at "impartiality of thought as well as ot action" an 
indication that the President saw no moral difference between 
the two sides. From that moment any good result of the Presi- 
dent's suggestion, in America or in the allied countries, was out ot 
the question; and if any hope had remained, the Germans pres- 
ently destroyed it. They wanted a peace conference with no 
terms stated beforehand, where they could play on the divergent 
interests of the allied countries; nor did they want the President 
to have anything to do with the making of peace, lest, as Bethmann 
Hollweg expressed it to Bernstorff, the Germans should be "robbed 
of their gains by neutral pressure." So the German reply on 
Dec. 26 politely observed that a direct conference between the 
belligerents would seem most appropriate, which conference the 
German Government proposed. For the general idea ot a League 
of Nations the Germans expressed their approval, but they 
wanted peace of their own kind first. 

46 



The allied reply was delayed until Jan. ii, but at least it met 
the President's request for details. It laid down the specifications 
of what the allied powers would regard as a just peace, and the 
bulk of that program was eventually to be written into the Treaty '^ 
of Versailles. But at the time, of course, it was evident that the 
belligerents were further from agreement than, they thought, or 
at any rate than the President thought. Of such terms (Germany 
would hear nothing; nor would her Government give to the Pres- 
ident, even in confidence, its own idea of the specifications ot a just 
peace. 

So the President, determined to carry out his program in spite of 
all obstacles, finally went before the Senate on Jan. 22, 1917, and 
laid down some general considerations of what he thought a just 
peace should be like. It was the logical next step in his effort to 
stop the war before America should become involved, but it was 
taken under conditions which made success impossible. As a 
matter of fact, the (iermans had already decided to resume the 
unrestricted submarine war; the decision had been taken on 
Jan, 9, but was not to be announced till Jan. 31. Moreover, in 
America and the allied countries public sentiment wa.s unprepared 
for anything like the speech of Jan. 22. Few people in the United 
States realized the danger. Mr. Lansing had followed upon the 
December note with a statement to correspondents that if the war 
were not soon stopped America might be drawn mto it. That was 
the fact, but it depended on information unknown to the public; 
and though the most natural inference was that a new crisis with 
Germany was at hand no one knew exactly how to take it — par- 
ticularly as Lansing, on orders from the White House, hastened to 
explain that he had been misunderstood. 

Moreover, the President was still desperately striving to keep 
in good understanding with the German Government, and in 
pursuance of this policy James W. Gerard, the Ambassador to 
Germany, had declared at a dinner in Berlin on Jan. 6 that the 
relations between America and Germany had never been better 
than thev were at that moment. This, also, the public in the 
United States found it hard to understand. If Lansing's reference 
to the danger of war had meant anything, what did this mean? 

So the President's address to the Senate on Jan. 22 did not iind 
could not have the reception that he hoped. He set forth his idea 
of the necessity of a League of Nations, he declared that the peace 
must be based on democratic principles and on the doctrine that 
was to become famous before long under the name of self-determiT 
nation. There must be no more forcible conquests, no more bar- 
tering of unwilling populations. The peace that ended this war, 
he said, must be guaranteed by a League of Nations— of all nations; 
and if America was to enter that League she must be assured that 
the peace was a peace worth guaranteeing. 

So far every one might have followed him, in America at least; 

47 



but the President called such a peace a "peace without victory," 
and to the supporters of the Allies in America, rendered suspicious 
by a course whose motives they could not see, that meant a peace 
without allied victory and consequently an unjust peace. Few 
of the President's public addresses have been more unfavorably 
received. 

Wilson had stated his peace terms— of course, only m general 
principles; the Allies had stated theirs in detail. Except for an 
article in a New York evening newspaper, inspired by BernstorfF 
but bearing no mark of authority, the German terms had not even 
been suggested. On the day following his Senate speech, according 
to Bernstorff, the President volunteered to issue a call for an 
immediate peace conference if only the Germans would state their 
terms. But they did not state them until the 29th, when a note 
for the President's private information detailed a program which 
was as obviously unacceptable to the allied powers as the Allies' 
terms were to the Germans. In any case this program had only 
an academic interest, for along with it came a formal notice that 
unrestricted submarine war would begin on Feb. i. 

The German Government had deliberately broken its promises 
of Sept. I, 1915, and May 5, 1916. Moreover, that Governrnent, 
which for months past had been sending the President private 
assurances of its hearty approval of his efforts toward peace, had 
by its intrusion and its refusal to deal openly wrecked those efforts 
when at last he had brought them to a head. There was only one 
thing to do, and the President did it. On Feb. 3 he announced to 
Congress the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany. 

But breaking of relations did not mean war. The President 
told Congress that if the threat against American lives and prop- 
erty conveyed by the resumption of submarine war were followed 
by overt acts of actual injury to Americans he would come before 
Congress once more and ask for authority to take the necessary 
steps to protect American interests. But for the moment he 
seems to have felt that only a warning was necessary; that the 
Germans, if convinced that America meant business, would 
reconsider their decision. And he added, "I take it for granted 
that all neutral Governments will take the same course." Logically 
they should have done so, since the proclamation of submarine 
war was virtually a declaration of war on all neutrals; but the 
European neutrals did not dare to run the risk even if they had 
been so minded. 

The submarines set to work and more ships were sunk, some of 
them ships with American passengers. The nation began to 
demand war to end an impossible situation. For the moment the 
President's aspirations were more moderate, and he asked Con- 
gress in the closing days of his first term for authority to arm 
American merchant ships for defense against submarines. The 
bill readily passed the House and commanded the support of 

48 




' I "HE tarmers, it seems to me, have 
occupied hitherto a singular posi- 
tion of disadvantage. They ha\e not 
had the same freedom to get credit on 
their real assets that others have had 
w ho were in manufacturing and com- 
mercial enterprises, and while they 
sustained our life, they did not in the 
same degree with some others share in 
the benefits of that life —From Presi- 
dent WiLson's remarks on signing the 
Rural Credits Bill, July 17, 1916. 





© Paul Thompson 

1918: The President acknowledging greetings at 
a military review 



seven-eighths of the Senate; but a dozen pacifists, pro-Germans 
and professional obstructionists, whom the President denounced 
as "a little group of willful men," filibustered it to death in the 
Senate in the last hours of the session. Almost the first act of the 
President after his inauguration, however, was the preparation to 
arm the ships by Executive authority. 

Meanwhile secret agents had discovered an attempt by the 
German Foreign Office to enlist Mexican and Japanese support in 
the prospective war against America by promising annexations in 
the Southwest and on the Pacific Coast. Publication of this on 
March i converted a good many Americans ot the interior who 
had hitherto been slow to recognize the seriousness of the German 
danger; and as the submarine campaign continued and no Euro- 
pean neutrals followed the American example, the sentiment in 
favor of declaration of war grew every day. 

But for the President this involved considerable logical diffi- 
cultv. From the^first he had striven to maintain "impartiality of 
thought," or at least of speech. He had said that the war was no 
concern of America's; it would be the task of long historical 
research to assign the responsibility for its outbreak; that "with 
its causes and objects we are not concerned. The obscure founda- 
tions from which its tremendous flood has burst forth we are not 
interested to search for and explore." It was a war which should 
be ended by a peace without a victory. Whatever meaning the 
President attached to these statements when he made them, the 
meaning attached to them by the public was a serious obstacle 
to the man who was going to have to lead the nation into war. But 
he solved the dilemma by a change of base which affected the whole 
political complexion of the war thereafter, which introduced a new 
and overriding issue — an issue which, addressing Congress on April 
2, he introduced to the world in his most famous phrase and the 
most effective of his speeches. America, he said, had no quarrel with 
the German people; that people had not made the war. But the 
Germans were ruled by an autocratic Government which had 
made neutrality impossible, which had shown itself "the natural 
foe of liberty." That Government had forced America to take 
up the sword for the freedom of peoples — of all peoples, even of 
the German people. America must fight "to make the world safe 
for democracy." On April 6, 191 7, Congress declared war. 

America at War, igij-igi8 

ONCE committed to war, the President found behind him a v^ 
nation more thoroughly united than could ever have been ^^ 
hoped in the dark days'of 191 5. Again, as in the week after 
the sinking of the Lusitania, he was the universally trusted leader 
of the people; and to a considerable extent the unity of the nation 
at the entrance into war could be traced back to the very policies 

51 



of delay which had been so sharply criticised. The people who 
had been on the side of the Allies from the first and who had seen 
through German pretenses long before were now solidly behind 
the President, for he had at last come over to their views. But 
other and important elements which might have been hostile two 
years before were now convinced of the necessity tor fighting the 
Germans. 

And the President's call to a crusade tor democracy won the 
support, permanent or temporar}', ot man)' ot those liberals who 
otherwise, in America and the allied countries, were inclined 
during the whole war to see in the Kaiser and Ludendorfi^ the 
natural allies of liberalism. There was a feeling ot great ideas 
stirring the world in the Spring of 1917. I he Russian revolution 
had just overthrown the most reactionary and apparently the 
most firmly established of autocratic Governments, and no one in 
Western Europe or America doubted that Russia would jump in 
six months as far as England, France and Amerjca had painfully 
toiled in two centuries, and become and remain a free democracy. 
If Russia had had a revolution, might not Germany have a revolu- 
tion, too? Would not the German people, whose injuries at the 
hands of their own rulers the President had so well pointed out, 
rise up and overthrow those rulers and bring about a just and 
lasting peace? Many people in the Spring ot 1917 expected 
exactly that; the millennium was just around the corner. 

Moreover, it seemed that perhaps the Allies would win the war 
in the field before America could get into it. A British offensive 
in Artois had important initial successes, and Nivelle's bloody 
failure on the Aisne was for a long time represented to the world 
as a brilliant victory. War, for America, might involve a little 
expenditure of money, but hardly any serious effort, acccording to 
the view wideU' current among the population in the Spring of 
1917; it was more than anything else an opportunity tor the display 
of commendable moral sentiments, and for enthusiastic acclama- 
tions to the famous allied leaders who presently began to come to 
the United States on special missions. It is hardly t(jo much 
to say that most of the American people went into this war in the 
triumphant mood usually reserved for the celebration of victory. 
■ It may some day be regarded as one of the chief merits ot the 
Wilson Administration that it was not affected by this piopular 
delusion. While a large part of the people seemed to expect a 
cheap and speedy victory by some sort of white magic, the Admin- 
istration was getting ready to work for victory. And thanks 
largely to the unity which had been bought by the President's 
caution in the two previous years, Congress and the people assented 
to measures of exertion and self-denial such as no man could have 
expected America to untlertake until compelled by bitter experi- 
ence. 

The first step was the dispatch of American na\al forces to aid 

52 



the Allies in the fight against the submarines, which for a few 
months were to come dangerously near justifying the confidence 
that had been placed in them. The process of naval reinforcement 
was slow, and not till 191 S did the American Navy become a 
really important factor in the anti-submarine campaign; but 
every destroyer atltled to the allied forces was of immediate value. 
The American Treasury was opened for vast credits to the Allies, 
who by their enormous purchases of war materials in the Tnited 
States had created the abounding prosperity of 1916, and had 
pretty nearly exhausted their own finances in doing so. More 
than that, the Administration began at once to prepare for the 
organization of a vast arm\'; and faced with this most important 
ckity of the conduct of the war, the President took the advice of 
the men who knew. The army officers knew that if America were 
to take a seri(His part in the war the regular army and the National 
(iuard would not be enough, nor even (iarrison's Continental 
Army which had been rejected in 1916. A big army would be 
needed, and the right way to raise it was by conscription. 

So the Selective Service act was introduced in Congress and 
passed in May, without very serious opposition. At the very start 
the American people had accepted a principle which had been 
adoptetl in the crisis of the Civil War only after two years of disas- 
ter and humiliation. It was the estimate of experts that this 
army would need a \-ear of training before it would be fit for the 
front line, antl a huge system of cantonments was hastily con- 
structetl to house the troops, while the nucleus of men trained in 
the Plattsburg camps was increased by the extension of the 
Plattsburg system all over the country. 

For the leadership of this army General Pershing was selected, 
not without considerable criticism from those who thought 
General Wood deserved the position. The reasons which led to 
the selection of Pershing are not yet officially known to the public, 
but Pershing's record was to be a sufficient justification of the 
appointment. 

But military and naval measures were only a part of the work 
needed to win this war. Allied shipping was being sunk by the 
submarines at an alarming rate, and new ships had to be provided. 
An enormous American program was laid out, and General Goe- 
thals, in whom there was universal confidence, was made head of 
the Emergency Fleet Corporation charged with its execution. 
But Goethals could not get along with William Denman, head of 
the Shipping Board, and changes of personnel were constant 
through the year until in 191 8 Charles M. Schwab was finally 
put in chief control of the shipbuilding program. 

For this and the development of the industrial program neces- 
sary for military efficiency the support of labor was essential. 
Mr. Wilson now reaped once more the benefit of a policy which 
had previously brought him much criticism. His retreat before 

53 



the railroad brotherhoods in August of 191 6, as well as the general 
policy of his Administration, had won him the invaluable support 
of the American Federation of Labor, and this good understanding, 
together with the unprecedented wage scales which came into 
operation in most industries with the war emergency, gave to the 
United States Government much more firm support from organized 
labor than most of the allied countries had been able to obtain. 

But this war touched every department of human affairs. The 
Allies were short of food, and one of the first achievements of the 
American Government was the institution of a limited food con- 
trol in the United States, under the directorship of Herbert Hoover. 
Saving of food by voluntary effort was popularized, and increased 
production and reduced consumption prevented the appearance 
of any serious food crisis in the allied countries. Later a fuel con- 
trol was instituted under Dr. Harry A. Garfield, and the principle 
of voluntary self-denial established by the Food Administration 
was carried on into the field of news, where the newspapers sub- 
mitted to voluntary restriction of the publication ot news that 
might unfavorably affect military and naval movements. The 
Committee on Public Information, headed by George Creel, was 
in general supervision of this work, and, though it was, on the 
whole, unpopular and accomplished no very useful purpose at 
home, it developed during 1918a service of European propaganda 
which was of immense value in heartening the Allies, informing 
the neutrals and discouraging the enemy. 

For all this money was needed, and in May and June the first 
Liberty Loan of |^ 2, 000, 000 ,000 was put before the public in an 
intensive campaign of publicity. Mr. McAdoo proved himself an 
extremely able advertiser of the public finances, and with the 
vigorous cooperation of banks and business men the loan was more 
than 50 per cent oversubscribed. There were other and larger 
loans later, but after the success of the first one there was no 
doubt that they would be taken; the first great accomplishment 
in national financing was almost as much of a surprise to the 
public as the ready acceptance of the draft. 

Early in April the railroads were put in charge of a committee 
of five railroad Presidents, who were given great powers in the 
combination of facilities for better service. But the system did 
not work well, and on Dec. 26, 1917, the President announced 
the assumption by the Government of control of the railroads for 
the war emergency, with Mr. McAdoo as Director General. 

Nineteen hundred and seventeen, then, saw the Wilson Admin- 
istration undertaking far heavier burdens than any previous 
Administration had attempted, and meeting with a measure of 
success which was beyond all prediction. The most powerful 
nation in the world was getting ready for war on an enormous 
scale, getting ready slowly, to be sure, but with a surprising ease 
and a surprising harmony. The nation which had re-elected the 

54 



President in November because he had kept it out of war was 
whole-heartedly behind him from April on as he led it into war. 

But great as was the President's moral authority at home, it 
was still greater abroad. The principles proclaimed in his address 
of April 2, and repeated and elaborated later in the year, became 
the creed of almost every political element in Europe except the 
German military party. The Russian revolution was still a 
liberalizing influence, in the early part of the year, and self-deter- 
mination began to be proclaimed over all Europe as the central 
principle of any satisfactory peace settlement. In the allied 
countries, where Mr. Wilson's forbearance toward Germany had 
been heaped with ridicule for the last two years, he became over 
night the interpreter of the ideals for which the democratic peoples 
were fighting. Hereafter in any negotiations with Germany the 
President by general consent acted as the spokesman of all the 
allied Governments, and the peoples of the allied countries 
accepted his declarations as a sort of codification ot the principles 
of the war. It must be left for the historian ot the future to decide 
how much of this deference was due to appreciation oi the Presi- 
dent's service in clarifying the allied ideals, and how much to his 
position as head of the most powerful nation in the world, whose 
mtervention was expected to bring victory to the Allies. 

But in other countries as well, Wilson's ideals had become a 
dogma to which everybody professed allegiance no matter what 
his views. The President's principles, as publicly expressed in his 
speeches, had been in effect a declaration of worthy ends, such 
as all right thinking persons desired. He had been less concerned 
with the means to those ends, and consequently all who agreed 
with his principles were inclined to assert that the President's 
ideals were exemplified by their own practices. In 1917 the Pres- 
ident enjoyed the unusual experience of seeing American liberals, 
British Laborites, three or four kinds of Russian Socialists, neutral 
Socialists, neutral clericals, neutral pacifists and even certain 
groups in the enemy countries all proclaiming their adherence to 
the ideals of President Wilson. 

For a time, indeed, it seemed that the war might be decided by 
moral force. Beginning to take alarm at the activity of America, 
and not yet certain of the effect of the Russian revolution (which 
was having grave consequences in Austria-Hungary) the Germans 
inclined during the Summer of 1917 to a new peace offensive. 
Bethmann Hollweg was dropped on July 14, and five days later 
a majority of the Reichstag voted for a peace virtually on the 
basis of the status quo ante. In August the Vatican issued a peace 
proposal suggesting a settlement on that general principle, with 
territorial and racial disputes to be left for later adjustment; 
and the Socialists of Europe were preparing to meet at Stockholm 
for a peace conference of their own influenced by the same ideas. 

But the President had changed his opinion that America had no 

55 



concern with the causes and the objects of the war; he had had to 
search tor and explore the obscure foundations from which the 
tremendous flood had burst forth. His Flag Day speech on 
June 14 showed that he was now thinking of the political and 
economic aspects of the German drive for world supremacy; 
and when the allied powers intrusted him with the task of answer- 
ing the Pope's peace suggestion in the name of all of them, he 
declared that "we cannot take the word of the present rulers of 
Germany as a guarantee for anything that is to endure." The 
German Government could not be trusted with a peace without 
victory. 

That peace offensive died out in early Fall. The Germans had 
lost interest, for they seemed likely to reach their objective in 
other ways. Things were going badly for the Allies. The offen- 
sives in the west had broken down and France's striking power 
seemed exhausted. Italy suffered a terrific defeat in October. 
America was preparing, but had not yet arrived, and the chief 
result of the Russian revolution had been the collapse of the eastern 
front. When in November the Bolsheviki overthrew Kerensky 
and prepared to make peace at any price, it was evident that the 
German armies in France would soon be enormously reinforced 
So the Winter of 191 7-1 8 saw a new peace offensive, but this 
time most of the work was done by the Allies, and the object was 
to detach Austria-Hungary from Germany. 

The item of principal interest in the long-range bombardment 
of speeches on war aims by which the statesmen of the various 
powers conducted this exchange of views was the proclamation 
of the famous Fourteen Points, in which the President for the 
first time put his ideas as to the conditions of a just peace into 
somewhat specific form. The origin of this program, which was 
eventually to become the basis of the peace treaty, is still a matter 
of conjecture. Lloyd George on Jan. 5, 1918, had stated war aims 
in some respects identical with those which the President embod- 
ied in the Fourteen Points three days later. A good deal of the 
program had been included in the allied statement of Jan. 11, 1917, 
but the Fourteen Points were somewhat more moderate. They 
seemed to be, indeed, a rather hasty recension of old programs in 
the effort to modify allied aspirations so that Austria would 
accept them; for while the Fourteen Points professed to contain 
the scheme of a just peace, they were set forth as a step in the 
endeavor to persuade Austria to desert her ally. As it happened, 
x'\ustria could not have deserted Germany even if she had desired; 
and, in any event, the effort to compromise was quite impracti- 
cable. The section referring to Austrian internal problems, for 
instance, proposed a solution which the Austrian Government 
had rejected only a few weeks before, and which the Austrian 
subject nationalities would no longer have been willing to accept 

56 



Whatever the origin of the Fourteen Points, their immediate 
effect was slight. The Austrians, and to a lesser extent the Ger- 
mans, professed interest, but it was soon apparent that the Ger- 
mans at least were not ready to approach the allied pomt ot view. 
And the Treaty of Brest-Li tovsk, forced upon Russia on March 3, 
was in such stark contrast with the benevolent professions oj 
(ierman statesmen that the President realized that nothing could 
be gained bv debate and compromise. On April 6, in a speech 
at Baltimore', he declared that onlv one argument was now of use 
against the Germans-" force to the utmost, force without stint 
or limit." The process of conversion from the viewpoint ot 
Tanuarv, I9i7> was complete. . , , 1 1 

\s a matter of fact, however, the application ot torcc had already 
begun On March 21 Ludendortf had opened his great offensive 
in France which was to bring the war to a German victory, and 
. for the next few months Foch, and not Wilson, was the dominant 
personalitv among the Allies. And for a time it seemed that 
however much America had contributed to the moral struggle 
between the alliances, she would be able to furnish comparatively 
little force. The winter of 191 7-1 8 had been full ot humiliations. 
The railroad disorganization which had led to the proclamation 
of Government control at the end of December was being cleared 
up only slowlv. The Fuel Administration was in an even worse 
tangle.' and in januarv business and industry had to shut down 
for several days throughout the whole Kastern part of the country 
in order to find coal to'move food trains to the ports. Great sums 
o'f money and enormous volumes of boasting had been expended 
on airplane construction without getting any airplanes. Hundreds 
of millions had been poured into shipyards and ships were on v 
beginning to come from the wavs. The richest nation in the world 
allowed hundreds of its soldiers to die in cantonment hospitals 
because of insufficient attention and inadequate supplies. Artil- 
lery regiments were being trained with wooden guns and only 
I ^0,000 Americans, manv of them technical troops, were in France. 
"The Secretary of War, called before a Congressional committee 
to answer questions on these shortcomings, had created the im- 
pression that he either did not know that anything was wrong 
or did not care. On Jan. 19 Senator Chamberlain, Chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Military Affairs, declared that "the 
militarv establishment of the United States has broken down; 
it has almost stopped functioning," and that there was ineffi^- 
ciencv in everv bureau and department of the Government. 
The next dav he introduced bills for a War Cabinet and a Director 
of Munitions, which would practically have taken the military 
and industrial conduct of the war out ot the President s hands. 

The President met the challenge boldly with the declaration 
that Senator Chamberlain's statement was "an astonishing and 
unjustifiable distortion of the truth," and must have been due to 



57 



President Wilson's program for the world's peace tvas outlined in the 
Fourteen Points, which constituted part of an address delivered before Congress 
January 8. 1918, as follows: 



No Private Understandings 

1 Open Covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall 
be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall 
proceed always frankly and in the public view. 

Freedom of the Seas 

2 Absolute Freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial 
waters, alike in peace and in war, except as the seas may be closed in whole 
or in part by international action for the enforcement of international 
covenants. 

No Economic Barriers 

3 The Removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the 
establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations 
consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 

Reduce National Armaments 

4 Adequate Guarantees given and taken that national armaments will 
be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 

Colonial Claims 

5 A Free, open minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of all 
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in 
determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests ot the popula- 
tions concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the 
government whose title is to be determined. 

Russian Territory 

6 The Evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of 
all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest cooperation 
of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and 
unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own 
political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome 
into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing, 
and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need 
and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister 
nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good-will, of 
their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests 
and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy. 



58 



Restoration of Belgium 

7 Belgil'm, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored 
without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common 
with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve 
to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have them- 
selves set and determined for the government of their relations with one 
another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of 
international law is forever impaired. 

Alsace-Lorraine to France 

8 All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored 
and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace- 
Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly fifty years, 
should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure m 
the interest of all. 

iVew Frontiers Jor Italy 

9 A Readjistment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along 
clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 

Autonomy in Austria-Hungary 

10 '1'he Peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations 
we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest 
opportunity of autonomous development. 

Rumania, Serbia and Montenegto 

11 Rumania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied 
territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and 
the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by 
friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nation- 
ality; and international guarantees of the political and economic independ- 
ence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered 
into. 

Autonomy in Turkey 

12 The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be 
assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now 
under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and 
an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and 
the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships 
and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 

For an Independent Poland 

13 An Independent Polish State should be erected which should include 
the territory inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should ht 
assured a free and secure access to the sea and whose political and economic 
independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international 
covenant. 

League of Nation 

14 A General association of nations must be formed under specific 
covenants for the purpose of aflFording mutual guaranties of political inde- 
pendence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike. 



59 



disloyalty to the Administration. Chamberlain's reply, while 
admitting that he might have overstated his case, was a procla- 
mation of loyalty to his Commander-in-Chiet and an appeal tor 
getting down to the business of winning the war. 

But the war did not go on into 191 9. If America could contrib- 
ute no aircraft and guns to the campaign of 191 8, she could at 
least contribute men. The emergency of March and April brought 
forth a prodigious effort, and soldiers began to be shipped across 
the Atlantic by hundreds of thousands. By July 4 there were 
a million, before the end of the year over 2,000,000; and they 
could fight. At the end of the Summer the Germans realized 
that the war was lost; and realizing it, they turned back to 
President Wilson's mediation which they had rejected eighteen 
months before, and to the Fourteen Points which had been looked 
on so coldly in the previous Winter. 

The first move was made by the Austrians, who on Sept. 15 
proposed a conference for a "preliminary and non-binding" 
discussion of war aims. The President refused the next day, 
with the observation that America's war aims had been stated 
so often that there could be no doubt what they were. But it was 
evident that more peace proposals would follow, and on Sept. 
27 the President delivered an address in the Metropolitan Opera 
House in New York in which his latest conception of the duties 
of the Peace Conference was set forth. He had realized that peace 
without victory was unsafe in view of the character of the Ger- 
man Government; it must be a peace with guarantees, for nobody 
would trust the Germans. But it must be a peace ot impartial 
justice, "involving no discrimination between those to whom we 
wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just," 
and the guarantee must be provided by a League of Nations 
which the Peace Conference itself — and not a subsequent general 
conference, as the President had held in the days ot his neutrality — 
must organize. The development was logical; nearly all the 
American powers had entered the war, and neutrals were tar less 
numerous than in 1916. And he argued that the League ot 
Nations must be formed at the Peace Conference, to be "in a 
sense the most essential part" of its work, because it was not likely 
that it could be formed after the conference, and it formed during 
the war it would only be an alliance of the powers associated 
against Germany. 

The Germans apparently thought these pronouncements 
offered some hope. Their Government was hastily being covered 
with a false front of democratic institutions to suit his insistence, 
and on Oct. 4 the new Chancellor, Prince Max of Baden, appealed 
to the President to call a peace conference at once, the basis ot 
peace to be the Fourteen Points and conditions set forth in the 
President's later addresses, specifically that of Sept. 27. There 
ensued an interchange of notes lasting throughout an entire 

60 



month, in which the President acted nominally as intermediary 
between the (iermans and the Allies, though actually he was in 
constant touch with allied statesmen. What began as a duel of 
diplomatic dexterity presently developed into a German diplo- 
matic rout as the German armies, retreating everywhere, drew 
nearer and nearer (ierman soil. Positions which the German 
Government hatl hoped to defend were successively abandoned; 
the Ciermans agreed to accept without argument the Fourteen 
Points, wth discussion at the conference limited only to details 
of their practical application, and to recognize the alterations 
which hatl been made in some of them by subsec^uent decisions of 
the American Ciovernment. They accepted the President's 
insistence that a peace conference must be conditional on an 
armistice which would imply complete evacuation of allied terri- 
torv and the assurance of "the present supremacy" of the allied 
armies, and they strove desperately to convince him that the 
democratization of the (ierman (iovernment was real. Delegates 
went to Marshal boch to discuss the armistice terms, and on 
Nov. 5 the Allies formally notified the President that they accepted 
the Fourteen Points, with the reservation of the freedom of the 
seas and subject to a definition of the restitution which the Ger- 
mans must make for damage done. 

On the same dav sailors of the (ierman High Sea Meet, ordered 
out to die fighting in a last thrust at the British, mutinied and 
began a revolution that spread all over the empire. From the 
balconv of the Imperial Palace in Berlin Karl Liebknecht pro- 
clamed the republic; the Kaiser fled across the Dutch border 
between two days; and on Nov. 1 1 the fighting ended and the 
Germans submitted to the terms imposed by Marshal toch. 

'Peace (^'i/^//<7-<7/a' and Treaty, IQIQ 

() the war had been ended by the military defeat of the Ger- 
mans. In arrantjing the preliminaries of peace Mr. Wilson s 
influence had be^en dominant. But the personal aspect of his 
triumph was far more imposing in 191 8 than it could possibly 
have been in 1916. Had his mediation ended the war before 
America entered it would have been bitterly resented in the allied 
countries and bv American svmpathizers of the xAUies But in 
the interval the President had appeared as the leader of the nation 
which furnished the decisive addition to allied strength that 
brought the final victorv; he had at last condemned in strong 
terms the German Government, toward which he had to maintain 
a neutral attitude earlier in the war, and he had had the satisfac- 
tion of seeing that Government overthrown at last when the Ger- 
man people realized that it had cost them more than it was worth. 
So now the war was ended in victory, but still ended by J^i'son s 
mediation, and moreover on terms which he himself had laid 



s 



61 



down — another triumph that would have been unthinkable two 
years earlier. In November, 191 8, Woodrow Wilson was exalted 
in the estimation of the world more highly than any other human 
being for a century past, and far more highly than any other 
American had ever been raised in the opinion of the peoples of 
Europe. 

But he had just suffered a surprising defeat at home. It became 
evident to Democratic leaders in the early Fall of 191 8 that they 
were likely to lose the Congressional elections. Democratic lead- 
ership in the House of Representatives had been so notoriously 
incompetent that most of the war measures had had to be carried 
through under the leadership of Republicans, and there was grave 
dissatisfaction with some of the members of the Cabinet. The 
appeals of Democrats in danger were heard sympathetically at 
the White House, and on Oct. 25 the President had issued a state- 
ment asking the people to vote for Democratic Congressional 
candidates "if you have approved of my leadership and wish me 
to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman in affairs at 
home and abroad." He admitted that the Republicans in Congress 
had supported the war, but declared that they had been against 
the Administration and that the time was too critical for divided 
leadership. It was the sort of appeal that any European Premier 
might have made upon "going to the country," and the President 
ended with the statement that "I am your servant and will accept 
your judgment without cavil." 

If this statement had never been issued, the results of the ensuing 
election might not have been accepted as a repudiation of the 
President. But he had made it a "question of confidence," to borrow 
a term from European politics, and the result was disastrous. 
The elections gave the Republicans a majority of thirty-nine in 
the lower house and a majority of two in the Senate, which by a 
two-thirds vote would have to ratify the peace treaty which the 
Executive would negotiate. In such a situation a European Pre- 
mier would, of course, have had to resign, but the President of the 
United States could hardly resign just as the war was coming to 
an end. The attempt to fit the parliamentary system into the 
framework of the American Constitution had failed. The Presi- 
dent made no comment on the outcome of the election, but he 
continued to be the unembarrassed spokesman of America in affairs 
at home and particularly abroad. It soon became known that he 
intended to go to the Peace Conference in person — at the request, 
it was intimated, of Clemenceau and Lloyd George. The criticism 
of this plan was by no means confined to Republicans, but the 
President persisted in it. There was a widespread demand for a 
non-partisan Peace Commission, but the apparent concession 
which the President finally made to this sentiment — the appoint- 
ment of Henry White, long out of the diplomatic service and never 
very active in politics, as the sole Representative on a commission 

62 



of five — satisfied the hulk of Republican sentiment not at all. 
It should be observed however, that behind the five official 
delegates there was a host of experts — military, economic, legal 
and ethnological — some of whom did very important service at 
the conference; and in the selection of this body no party lines 
had been drawn. 

On December 4 the President sailed from New York on an 
armv transport, accompanied by Mrs. Wilson and by a whole 
caravan of savants loaded down with statistics and documents. 
He left a nation whose sentiment was divided between sharp 
resentment and a rather apprehensive hope for the best, but he 
landed on a continent which was prepared to offer to Woodrow 
Wilson a triumphal reception such as European history had never 
known. The six weeks between his landing at Brest and the 
opening of the Peace Conference were devoted to a series of pro- 
cessions through Fngland, France and Italy, in which the Govern- 
ments and the people strove to outdo each other in expressing 
their enthusiasm for the leader of the great and victorious crusade 
tor justice and democracy. Sovereigns spiritual and temporal and 
the heads of Governments heaped him with all the honors in their 
power, and crowds of workingmen stood for hours in the rain that 
thev might see him for a moment at a railroad station. Even 
from neutral Holland, divided Ireland and hostile Germany came 
invitations to the President, and he would probably have been 
received by those peoples as enthusiastically as by British, PVench 
and Italians. 

P'or the war had been ended on the basis of the ideals of Presi- 
dent Wilson. Those ideals had been expressed in vague and 
general terms, and every Government thought that its own war 
aims coincided with them. Every people, suddenly released from 
the long and terrible strain of the war, thought that all its troubles 
were suddenly to be ended by the principles of President Wilson. 
Jugo-Slavs and Italians claimed Istria and Fiume, and each felt 
itself supported by the principles of President Wilson. To French- 
men those principles meant that Germany must pay for the war 
forced on France, and to Germans they meant that a ruined 
France and an uninvaded Germany could start again on the 
same footing. 

The Peace conference that began on January 18 was bound to 
disillusion a great many people, including President Wilson him- 
self. Principles had to be translated into practice, and every 
effort to do so left one party to the dispute, if not both, convinced 
that the principles had been betrayed. The treaty which was 
eventually produced led American liberals to complain that the 
President' had surrendered to European imperialism, and brought 
from such Republicans as still admired the Allies the complaint 
that he had betrayed allied interests at the promptings of pacifism. 
Equally diverse opinions might have been obtained from all types 



63 



of extremists in Europe. The F'ourteen Points were susceptible 
of varying interpretations, according to individual interests; and 
at the very outset the American delegates found some of the allied 
leaders contending that they need not be considered, since the 
Germans had surrendered, not because they regarded the prin- 
ciples of President Wilson as just, but because they had been 
beaten. There was undoubtedly a great deal of truth in this 
contention, but the American delegates succeeded in holding the 
conference to the position that having accepted the German 
surrender on certain terms it would have to abide by those terms. 
The terms had to be interpreted, however, and every agreement 
on the details led to a protest from somebod>' that the President 
had abandoned the F'ourteen Points. 

All this, together with the growing Republican opposition at 
home which was making itself heard in Europe, led to a rapid 
decline in the President's prestige. So long as it was a question 
of generalities he was the moral leader of the peoples of the world, 
but after a few weeks of getting down to particulars he was only 
the head of the peace delegation of a single State — and a State 
in which there was already serious opposition to his policy. This 
altered standing was made evident toward the end of April, when 
a protracted disagreement with the Italian delegation over the 
Adriatic question led the President to issue a declaration of his 
position which was virtually an appeal to the Italian people over 
the heads of their own representatives. Nowhere had the Presi- 
dent been received with more enthusiasm than in his trip through 
Italy four months before; but now Dr. Orlando, the Italian 
Premier, went home and promptly got a virtually unanimous 
vote of confidence trom his Parliament, which was supported by 
the overwhelming majority of the people. 

The treaty was finally signed on June 28, and the President. 
left at once for home to take up the fight to get it through the 
Senate — a fight which, it was already apparent, would be about 
as hard as the struggle to get any treaty evolved at all out of the 
conflicting national interests in Paris. There was a demonstration 
for him at Brest as he left French soil, but nothing like the en- 
thusiasm that had greeted his arrival. This was perhaps the 
measure of his inevitable decline in the estimation of Europe; it 
remained to be seen how he stood at home. As early as January 
I, before the Peace Conference met. Senator Lodge, Republican 
leader in the Senate, had declared that the conference ought to 
confine itself to the Peace Treaty and leave the League of Nations 
for later discussion. 

On February I4, after the first reading of the League covenant, 
the President had made a hurried trip home to talk it over with 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations — a committee that 
had been loaded up with enemies of the League of Nations. The 
members of the committee dined with him at the White House 

64 



on February 26, and the covenant was discussed tor several hours. 
But the President could not convert the doubters; on March 3 
Senator Lodge announced that thirty-seven Republican Senators 
were opposetl U) the League in its present torm, and that they 
regarded a demand tor its alteration as the exercise of the Senate's 
constitutional right ot advice on treaties. The President took up 
the challenge, and on the following day, just before sailing back 
to Paris, he declared in a public address that the League and 
treat)' were inextricably interwoven; that he did not intend to 
bring back "the corpse ot a treaty," and that those who opposed 
the League must be deat to the demands ot common men the 
world over. 

The fight was now begun. Some modifications were matle in 
the covenant in the direction of meeting criticisms by Klihu Root, 
but it was adopted. On July 10 the treaty was laid before the 
Senate and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, 
which at once began to hear opinif)ns on it. The President him- 
self appeared before the committee on August 19. Outside the 
Senate party lines were breaking up; the Irish and (ierman ele- 
ments who had come into line during the war, but hatl felt that 
their interpretation ot President Wilson's ideals had been violated 
by the treaty, were aligned in support ot the Republican opposi- 
tion; and a certain element ot the Democratic Party which 
inclined to admire the theory of traditional isolation tound itself 
in harmony with the Republicans. On the other hand, many 
moderate Republicans supported the President, chiet among them 
Mr. Tatt; and in the churches and colleges support of the League 
commanded an overwhelming majority. 

Convinced that the people were behind him against the Senate, 
or would be behind him it they understood the issue, the Presi- 
dent left Washington on September 3 for another appeal to the 
country. Declaring that if America rejected the League it would 
"break the great heart of the world," he went to the Pacific Coast 
on a long and arduous speaking tour, another request, in effect, 
tor a vote of confidence for his work as Premier. The effort was 
too much; he broke down at Wichita, Kan., on September 26, 
and was hurried back to the White House, where tor weeks he 
lay disabled by an illness whose nature and seriousness were care- 
fully concealed at the time, and even yet but imperfectly under- 
stood. Meanwhile the treaty had been reported out of committee, 
and the offering of a multitude of amendments, all of which were 
defeated, led eventually to the drawing up of the "Lodge reserva- 
tions," finally adopted on November 16. 

Nobody knew how sick the President was, but Senator Hitch- 
cock, who had led the tight for the treaty in the Senate, saw him 
on November 18 and was told that in the President's opinion the 
Lodge reservations amounted to nullification of the treaty. So 
the Democrats voted against the treaty. I>odge's refusal to 

65 



accept Wilson's treaty was as unshakable as Wilson's refusal to 
accent Lodge's treaty. When the special session ended and the 
regular session began the President eventually yielded a little 
and consented to interpretative reservations proposed by Senator 
Hitchcock, But this would not satisfy the Republicans; and on 
March 20 the rejected treaty was finally sent back to the W^hite 
House. 

The Closing Tear, ig20-ig2i 

rHE President's recovery was slow, and the first incidents of 
his return to the management of public affairs were rather 
startling, in view of the abrupt manner with which he re- 
sumed the direction of executive policy. During his illness the 
Cabinet had met from time to time and in a fashion had carried 
on the routine work of the executive department. Had it not 
done so, had the gravity of the President's illness been generally 
known, the demand which was heard for an explanation of the 
constitutional reference to the "disability of the President" and 
an understanding of the circumstances under which the Vice- 
President might assume the office would have been much stronger. 
There was a good deal of apprehension, therefore, when Secretary 
of State Lansing resigned, and the published correspondence 
showed that the President had regarded his action in calhng Cabi- 
net meetings as a usurpation of Presidential authority. It was 
evident from the correspondence that another and perhaps 
stronger reason for the President's disapproval had been the 
action of the Secretary in conducting a Mexican Policy on his 
own initiative, during the President's illness, which showed con- 
siderable divergence from the President's own. Nevertheless, the 
manner of the action caused some uneasiness and there was much 
surprise \yhen Mr. Lansing was replaced by Bainbridge Colby, a 
comparatively recent proselyte from the Progressive Party. 

There was still further uncertainty as to the condition of the 
President when he re-entered with a series of rather sharp notes 
into the Adriatic controversy, which England, France and Italy 
had been trying to settle, without consulting the Jugoslavs, 
during his illness; and a letter to Senator Hitchcock on" March 8, 
asserting that the militarist party was at that time in control of 
France, aroused grave misgivings on both sides of the Atlantic. 
These, however, were unjustified; the President's improvement, 
though gradual, continued. But the work of the Executive 
during 1920 was far less important than in previous years, for the 
interest of the country was concentrated on the Presidential 
election. 

On January 8 a letter from the President had been read at the 
Jackson Day dinner in Washington, in which he refused to accept 
the Senate's decision on the treaty as the decision of the nation. 

66 



"If there is any doubt as to what the people of the country think 
about the matter," he added, "the clear and single way out is 
to give the next election the form of a great and solemn 
referendum." Once more, as in 191 8, the President had asked 
for a verdict on his leadership. There was some perturbation 
among the Democratic leaders, for into a Presidential election so 
many issues enter that it would be difficult to regard it as a 
referendum on any particular issue. It might have been so 
accepted if the President himself had come forward as a candidate 
for a third term, but there was no sign from the White House as 
to his attitude on this issue, and there was no spontaneous demand 
for him outside. The leading candidate during the pre-conyention 
campaign was William (i. McAdoo, the President's son-in-law, 
who had resigned as Secretary of the Treasury and Director 
General of Railroads after making a successful record during the 
war, and before the criticism of the Wilson Administration as a 
whole had become acute. McAdoo had the powerful support of 
organized labor and most of the Federal office-holders, but whether 
or not he had the support of the White House no man knew. The 
Republicans assumed it for their own purposes, and Senator 
Lodge's keynote speech at the Chicago Convention was full of 
denunciations of the "Wilson dynasty"; but if McAdoo were 
Wilson's candidate the President showed no sign of knowing it. 

That McAdoo was not nominated, however, can be ascribed 
very largely to his relationship to the President and the suspicion 
that he Was the President's candidate. The Democratic Con- 
v^ention at San Francisco adopted a platform praising and in- 
dorsing the President's record in all details. The convention had 
to do that; the President's record was the party's record. Homer 
Cummings as Temporary Chairman kept the convention cheered 
up by a keynote speech of eulogy of that record, which moved 
the assembled Democrats to such enthusiasm that Secretary of 
State Colby, who had not been a Democrat long enough to know 
much about the behavior of the species, declared that at any 
movement that day the rules could have been suspended and the 
President renominated by acclamation. But when the convention 
came down to the work of nomination the President was not con- 
sidered, and the delegates devoted themselves to finding the most 
available man who had not had any connection with the Ad- 
ministration. James M. Cox was finally nominated on Woodrow 
Wilson's record and sent out to the great and solemn referendum. 

Aside from a formal proclamation of unity of ideals and in- 
tentions with the candidate, the White House took practically no 
part in the campaign. Not until October, when a delegation of 
pro-League Republicans called at the White House, was it known 
that the President's health had temporarily taken a turn for the 
worse and that active participation would have been impossible. It 
could hardly have aflected the result very much in either direction. 

67 



Whether or not the President had intended to turn over the 
Government to Hughes in November, 1916, he did nothing so 
unkind to Harding in November, 1920. The President-elect was 
allowed plenty of time to try to choose his Cabinet and his policies, 
but the Administration had gradually withdrawn from all con- 
nection with European affairs, and it was made known soon after 
Congress met in December that nothing would be done which 
might embarrass the new Administration in its handling of foreign 
relations and interrelated problems. 

The history of Woodrow Wilson's Administration virtually 
ends with the rejection of the treat)'; but the business of govern- 
ment had to be carried on through the final year. During 1920 
old issues that had long been hidden behind the war clouds came 
out into the open again. Obregon overthrew Carranza and 
entered into power in Mexico, but the Wilson Administration 
maintained neutrality during the brief struggle. Ambassador 
Fletcher had resigned, but Henry Morgenthau, appointed to 
succeed him, did not obtain the confirmation of the Senate, and 
the new Administration had not been formally recognized at the 
end of President Wilson's term. A controversy over the status of 
American oil rights was one of the chief impediments to recog- 
nition, though Obregon's general attitude was far more friendly 
to America than that of Carranza. 

The President in November announced the boundaries of 
Armenia, which he had drawn at the request of the European 
Allies. But these boundaries were of no particular interest by 
that time, since the Turks and the Bolsheviki were already par- 
titioning Armenia; and the mediation between the Turks and 
Armenians which the Allies requested the President to undertake 
was forestalled by the Bolshevist conquest of the remnant of the 
country. The Adriatic dispute, in which the President had taken 
such a prominent part in 1919, was finally settled without him 
b}- direct negotiation between Italy and Jugoslavia. In one other 
international problem, however, that of Russia, the United States 
Government still exerted some influence. The President during 
1918 had showed more willingness to believe in the possibility of 
some good coming out of Bolshevist Russia than most of the 
European Governments, and the American Expeditionary Forces 
in Siberia took no active part in the fighting there. At the Peace 
Conference the President had been willing to call the various 
Russian parties to the Prinkipo conference, but nothing came of 
this; and America eventually took up a middle ground toward 
Russia. While the British seemed ready to make friends with 
the Bolsheviki and the French remained irreconcilably hostile, 
the American Government — whose policy was fully set forth in a 
note of August 10, 1920 — refused to attack them, but also to 
have any dealings with them. This policy was much criticised as 
being purely negative, but toward the end of Mr. Wilson's Ad- 

68 



ministration both England and France were tending to follow 
it through the force o\ circumstances, F!,ngland's effort to find a 
basis of trade relations with Bolshevist Russian being as futile as 
France's support of anti-Bolshevist revolutionary movements. 

The Republicans and their Irish supporters in the 1920 cam- 
paign revived the old demand tor the exemption of American 
shipping from the Panama Canal tolls, but this and various other 
differences with Fngland which arose toward the end of Mr. 
\M!s(jn's Administration were left over tor settlement by the new 
President. More urgent, however, was another ancient issue now 
revived — the California land question. In 1917, when America 
was just entering the war and could not aftord any dangerous 
entanglements on the Pacific, the Lansing-Ishii agreement was 
negotiated with Japan. By this the L'nited States recognized 
Japan's "special interests" in China, particularly in "the parts 
to which her territory is contiguous," while both powers professed 
agreement on the principles ot Chinese independence and terri- 
torial integrity, and the open tloor. However necessary this con- 
cession in order to protect an exposed flank in time of war, it was 
regarded with much alarm by friends of Chi-na, whose wrath was 
later aroused by the action of the President at the Peace Con- 
ference in agreeing to the cession of Shantung to Japan. There 
was a renewed antagonism between American and Japanese 
interests in certain quarters, and the .American Army in Siberia, 
if it did nothing else, at least kept the Japanese from seizing 
Vladivostok uiUil the .Americans had left. 

With this background, the situation created by the revival of 
anti-Japanese agitation in California seemed more or less dis- 
quieting, but when a more stringent land law was enacted by 
the Calitornians in November negotiations between the two 
Governments began at once and are still going on at the close of 
the .Administration with good prospect of agreement. 

The President's unpopularity had been so violently expressed 
by the election ot November 2 that it was bound to be mitigated 
soon after, and this natural reaction was aided by the failure of 
the Republican Congress to accomplish anything in the short 
session and by President-elect Harding's slowness in deciding 
among candidates otfered for the Cabinet and policies put forward 
tor his attention. As President Wilson prepared to turn over the 
executive duties to his successor there was already evidence that 
the -American public was returning to a greater appreciation of 
his services. As a token of the estimation in which he was still 
held by the more intelligent circles abroad, the Nobel Peace Prize 
was awarded to him in December, 1920; and European statesmen 
who had opposed him at the Peace Conference were already 
expressing surprise at learning that Mr. Harding believed that 
the League ot Nations was dead. 

Copyright New York Times. 

Published through the courtesy of the Neiv York Times. 

69 



THE FOUNDERS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS 



'• «.'.»'/Vrf»»'«' 



\P 




Baltridge in Stars and Stripes 



Make hrm, O GckI, the peace our dead have won. 

For folly shakes the tinsel on her head 
And points us back to darkness and to hell. 

Cackling, "Beware of Visions, ' while our dead 
Still cry, "It was for visions that we fell. 

— Alfred Noyes 



70 



In jFlaniers fiMs 

:&? Xicut. Col. 3obn 5Tlc(i:rca 



In Flanders fields the poppies grow 
Between the crosses, row on row, 
That mark our place, and in the sky 
The larks still bravely singing, tly, 
Scarce heard amid the guns behjw. 

We are the dead. Short days ago 
We lived, felt dawn, saw sunset glow. 
Loved and were loved, and now we lie 

In Flanders fields. 

Take up our quarrel with the toe! 
To you from failing hands we throw 
The torch. Be yours to lift it high! 
If ye break faith with us who die 
We shall not sleep, tho poppies blow 
In Flanders fields. 



America's Answer 

»j ?l. ^. Xillar6 

Rest ye in peace, ye Flanders dead! 

The fight that ye so bravely led 
We've taken up! And we will keep 

True faith with you who lie asleep. 
With each a cross to mark his bed, 

And poppies blowing overhead 
Where once his own life blood ran red! 

So let your rest be sweet and deep 
In Flanders fields! 

Fear not that ye have died for naught, 
The torch ye threw to us we caught! 

Ten million hands will hold it high. 
And Freeciom's light shall never die! 

We've learned the lesson that ye taught 
In Flanders fields! 

71 



!J\ece55lonal 

r^Y 5\icbcir6 Xintbicum 



I 

The tide is at the ebb, as if to mark 

Our turning backward from the guiding light; 
Grotesque, uncertain shapes infest the dark 

And wings ot bats are heard in aimless flight; 
Discordant voices cry and serpents hiss, 

No friendly star, no beacon's beckoning ray; 
We follow, all forsworn, with steps amiss, 

Envy and Malice on an unknown way. 
But he who bore the light in night of war, 

Swiftly and surely and without surcease, 
Where other light was not, save one red star. 

Treads now, as then, the certain path to peace, 
Wounded, denied, but radiant of soul, 
Steadfast in honor, marches toward the goal. 

II 

The spirit that was Peace seems but a wraith, 

The glory that was ours seems but a name, 
And like a rotten reed our broken faith. 

Our boasted virtue turned to scarlet shame 

By the low, envious lust of party power; 

While he upon the heights whence he had led, 
Deserted and betrayed m victory's hour. 

Still wears a victor's wreath on unbowed head. 
The Nation gropes — his rule is at an end. 

Immortal man of the transcendent mind. 
Light-bearer of the world, the loving friend 

Of little peoples, servant of mankind! 
O land of mine! how long till you atone? 
How long to stand dishonored and alone? 

lo Woodrow IFilson, March ./, ig2i. 




WE must hearten and quicken the 
spirit and efficiency of labor 
throughout our whole industrial sys- 
tem by everywhere and in all occupa- 
tions doing justice to the laborer, not 
only by paying a living wage but also 
by making all the conditions that sur- 
round labor what they ought to be. 
And we must do more than justice 
We must safeguard life and promote 
health and safety in every occupation 
in which they are threatened or im- 
periled. That is more than justice, 
and better, because it is humanity and 
economy. — From President Wilson's 
Speech of Acceptance at Shadow Lawn, 
September!, 1916. 



SLnnnii 




Harris if Ewing 

President Wilson as he looked during the Peace Conference in Paris 



Woodro'\v Wilson s Tlace in History 

By General the Ri^JU Honorable Jan Christian Smuts, Premier oj 
the Union of South Ajrica 

General the Riyht Honorable Ian Christian Smuts, premier of the Union 
of South Africa, 'served with Presiilent Wilson on the Leaj^ue ot Nations 
commission of the peace conference. ^ , , • i u 

Gen. Smuts was an active leader of the Boer Army m the helc m the Boer 
war. He is a graduate of Cambridge University in hngland, served as 
state attorney for the South African Republic, and was known as a member 
of the bar at Cape Town. ■ . , , 

Accepting the outcome of the Boer war, he entereil the service ot the 
British Government, becoming colonial secretary for the 1 ransvaal in 
1907 and exercising a leading influence as a delegate in the national con- 
vention in 1910, which drew up the constitution for the present Union ot 
South Africa. He was minister of the defense of the South African Govern- 
. ment and commanded the troops in the campaign against the Germans in 
■ East Africa in 1916-17. Promoted to be an honorary lieutenant-general, he 
was the South African representative in the imperial war cabmet in 1917-18. 
This led to his prominence in the peace conference and to his close contact 
with President Wilson. On February 8, of this year. Premier Smuts and the 
South African partv won a tlecisive victory at the polls over Gen. Hertzog 
and those who advocated the secession of South Africa from the British 
Empire. 
Written for the New York Kvening Post and Ihe Washington Herald 

Pretoria, South Ajrica, January 8, ig2i. 

It has been suggested that I should write a short estimate and 
appraisal of the work of President Wilson on the termination of his 
Presidency of the United States of America. I feel I must comply 
with the suggestion. I feel I may not remain silent when there is 
an opportunity to sav a word of appreciation for the work of one 
with whom I came into close contact at a great period and who 
rendered the most signal service to the great human cause. 
■ There is a great saving of Mommsen (I believe) in reference to 
the close of Hannibal's career in failure and eclipse: "On those 
whom the gods love thev lavish infinite joys and infinite sorrows.^ 
It has come back to my mind in reference to the close of Wilson s 
career. For a few brief moments he was not only the leader of 
the greatest State in the world; he was raised to far giddier heights 
and became the center of the world's hopes. And then he tell, 
misunderstood and rejected by his own people, and his great 
career closes apparently in signal and tragic defeat. 



Position of Terrible Greatness 

What is the explanation for this tremendous tragedy, which is 
^ot solely American, which closely concerns the whole world? 
Of course, there are purely American elements in the explanation 
which I am not competent to speak on. But besides the American 
quarrel with President Wilson there is something to be said on 
the great matters in issue. On these I may be permitted to say 
a few words. 

The position occupied by President Wilson in the world's 
imagination at the close of the great war and at the beginning of 
the peace conference was terrible in its greatness. It was a terrible 
position for any mere man to occupy. Probably to no human 
being in all history did the hopes, the prayers, the aspirations of 
many millions of his fellows turn with such poignant intensity 
as to him at the close of the war. At a time of the deepest dark- 
ness and despair, he had raised aloft a light to which all eyes 
had turned. He had spoken divine words of healing and con- 
solation to a broken humanity. His lofty moral idealism seemed 
for a moment to dominate the brutal passions which had torn 
the Old World asunder. And he was supposed to possess the 
secret which would remake the world on fairer lines. The peace 
which W^ilson was bringing to the world was expected to be God's 
peace. Prussianism lay crushed; brute force had failed utterly. 
The moral character of the universe had been signally vindicated. 
There was a universal vague hope in a great moral peace, of a new 
world order arising visibly and immediately on the ruins of the 
old. This hope was not a mere superficial sentiment. It was the 
intense expression at the end of the war of the inner moral and 
spiritual force which had upborne the peoples during the dark 
night of the war and had nerved them in an effort almost beyond 
human strength. Surely, God had been with them in that long 
night of agony. His was the victory; His should be the peace. 
And President W'ilson was looked upon as the man to make this 
great peace. He had voiced the great ideals of the new order; 
his great utterances had become the contractual basis for the 
armistice and the peace. The idealism of Wilson would surely 
become the reality of the new order of things in the peace treaty. 

Saved the ''Little Child'' 

In this atmosphere of extravagant, almost frenzied expectation 
he arrived at the Paris Peace Conference. Without hesitation h^ 
plunged into that inferno of human passions. He went down into 
the Pit like a second Heracles to bring back the fair x'\lcestis of 
the world's desire. There were six months of agonized waiting, 
during which the world situation rapidly deteriorated. And then 
he emerged with the peace treaty. It was not a W^ilson peace, 

76 



and he made a tatal mistake in somehow giving the impression 
that the peace was in accord with his Fourteen Points and his 
various declarations. Not so the world had understood him. 
This was a punic peace, the same sort of peace as the victor had 
dictated to the vanquished for thousands of years. It was not 
Alcestics; it was a haggard, unlovely woman with features dis- 
torted with hatred, greed and selfishness, and the little child that 
the woman carried was scarcely noticed. Yet it was tor the saving 
of the child that Wilson hatl labored until he was a physical wreck. 
Let our other great statesmen and leaders enjoy their well-earned 
honors for their unquestioned success at Paris. To Woodrow 
Wilson, the apparent failure, belongs the undying honor, which 
will grow with the growing centuries, of having saved the "little 
child that shall lead them yet." \o other statesman but Wilson 
could ha\e done it. .And he did it. 

T'eople T)id ^^(ot Understand 

The people, the common people of all lands, did not understand 
the significance of what had happeneci. They saw only that 
hard, unlovely Prussian peace, and the great hope died in their 
hearts. The great disillusionment took its place. I'he most recep- 
tive mood for a new start the world had been in for centuries passed 
away. Faith in their governors antl leaders was largely destroyed 
and the foundations of the human government were shaken in a 
way which will be felt for generations. The Paris peace lost an 
opportunity as unique as the great war itself. In destroying the 
moral idealism born of the sacrifices of the war it did almost as 
much as the war itself in shattering the structure of Western 
civilization. 

And the odium for all this fell especially on President Wilson. 
Round him the hopes had centered; round him the disillusion and 
despair now gathered. Popular opinion largely held him respon- 
sible for the bitter disappointment and grievous failure. The 
cynics scoffed; his friends were silenced in the universal disap- 
pointment. Little or nothing had been expected from the other 
leaders; the whole failure was put to the account of W'oodrow 
Wilson. And finally America for reasons of her own joined the 
pack and at the end it was his own people who tore him to pieces. 

zM^iist Wait for judgment 

W^ill this judgment, born of momentary disillusion and dis- 
appointment, stand in future, or will it be reversed? The time 
has not come to pass final judgment on either Wilson or any of the 
other great actors in the drama at Paris. The personal estimates 
will depend largely on the interpretation of that drama in the 
course of time. As one who saw and watched things from the 
inside, I feel convinced that the present popular estimates are 

77 



largely superficial and will not stand the searching test of time. 
And I have no doubt whatever that Wilson has been harshly, 
unfairly, unjustly dealt with, and that he has been made a scape- 
goat for the sins of others. Wilson made mistakes, and there were 
occasions when I ventured to sound a warning note. But it was 
not his mistakes that caused the failure for which he has been 
held mainly responsible. 

Let us admit the truth, however bitter it is to do so, for those 
who believe in human nature. It was not Wilson who tailed. 
The position is tar more serious. It was the human spirit itselt 
that failed at Paris. It is no use passing judgments and making 
scapegoats of this or that individual statesman or group of states- 
men. Idealists make a great mistake in not facing the real facts 
sincerely and resoluteh'. They believe in the power of the spirit, 
in the goodness which is at the heart of things, in the triumph 
which is in store for the great moral ideals ot the race. But this 
faith only too often leads to an optimistii which is sadly and 
fatally at variance with actual results. 

Says HumiDiitv Fciilcd 

It is the realist and not the idealist who is generally justified by 
events. We forget that the human spirit, the spirit of goodness 
and truth in the world, is still only an infant crying in the night, 
and that the struggle with darkness is as yet mostly an unequal 
struggle. 

Paris proved this terrible truth once more. It was not Wilson 
who failed there, but humanity itself. It was not the statesmen 
that failed so much as the spirit of the peoples behind them. The 
hope, the aspiration for a new world order ot peace and right and 
justice — however deeply and universally lelt — was still only 
feeble and ineffective in comparison with the dominant national 
passions which found their expression in the peace treaty. Rven 
if Wilson had been one of the great demi-gods of the human race, 
he could no.t have saved the peace. Knowing the Peace Coh'- 
ference as I knew it from within, I teel convinced in my own mind 
that not the greatest man born ot woman in the history ot the 
race would have saved that situation. The great hope was not 
the heralding of the coming dawn, as the peoples thought, but 
only a dim intimation of some far-otf event toward which we shall 
yet have to make many a long, weary march. Sincerely as we 
believed in the moral icieals for which he had fought, the tempta- 
tion at Paris of a large booty to be divided proved too great. And 
in the end not only the leaders but the peoples preferred a bit 
of booty here, a strategic frontier there, a coal field or an oil well, 
an addition to their population or their resources — to all the faint 
allurements of the ideal. As I said at the time, the real peace 
was still to come, and it could only come from a new spirit in the 
peoples themselves. 

78 



IV Us on Had to "Be Conciliated 

What was reallv saved at Paris was the child— the covenant of 
the League of Nations. The political realists who had their eye 
on the loot were prepared— however reluctantly— to throw up that 
innocent little sop to President Wilson and his fellow idealists. 
After all there was not much harm in it, it threatened no present 
national'interest, andit gave great pleasure to a number ot good 
unpractical people in most countries. .Above all, President Wil- 
son had to be conciliated, and this was the Ust and the greatest 
of the fourteen points on which he had set his heart and by which 
he was determined to stand or fall. .And so he got his way. But 
it is a fact that onlv a man of his great power and influence and 
dogged determination could have carried the covenant through 
that Peace Conference. Others had seen with him the great 
vision; others had perhaps given more thought to the elaboration 
of the great plan. But his was the power and the will that carried 
it through. The covenant is Wilson's souvenir to the future of 
the world. No one will ever tleny that honor. 

(//r.// Crcati'vc -Document 

The honor is verv great, indeed, for the covenant is one of the 
great creative docuirTents of human history. The peace treaty 
will fade into merciful oblivion and its provisions will be gradua ly 
obliterated bv the great human tides sweeping over the w()rld. 
But the covenant will stand as sure as fate. Forty-two nations 
gathered round it at the f^rst meeting of the League at Geneva 
And the dav is not far off when all the free peoples of the world 
will gather around it. It must succeed, because there is no other 
wav for the future of civilization. ,It does not realize the great 
hopes born of the war, but it provides the only method and 
instrument bv which in the course of time those hopes can be 
realized. Speaking as one* who has some right to speak on the 
fundamental conceptions, objects and methods of the covenant, 
I feel sure that most of the present criticism is based on mis- 
understandings. These misunderstandings will .<;^|ear away, one 
bv one the peoples still outside the covenant will fall in behind 
this banner, under which the human race is going to march for- 
ward to triumphs of peaceful organization and achievements 
undreamt of bv us children of an unhappier era. And the leader 
who, in spite of apparent failure, succeeded in inscribing his name 
on that banner has achieved the most enviable and enduring 
immortalitv. Americans of the future will yet proudly and 
gratefullv rank him with W^ashington and Lincoln, and his name 
will have a more universal significance than theirs. 



79 



THE NOBLE PEACE PRIZE 1920 




WITHOUT THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE 
KiRBY IN THC New York World 



*' We die without distinction if we are not willing to die the 
death of sacrifice. Do you covet honor ? You will never get it 
by serving yourself. Do you covet distinction ? You will'get it 
only as a servant of mankind." 

— Woodrov Wilson's Address 
at Swarthmore College 

Oct. 5, 1913. 



80 



H^oodrolpp IVilson 



AN INTERPRETATION 



Published Through the Courtesv or the New York World 

No other American has made so much world history as Woodrow Wilson, who 
retires at noon today from the office of President of the United States. No other 
American has ever bulked so large in the affairs of civilization or wielded so com- 
manding an influence in shaping their ends. 

The great outstanding figure of the war, Mr. Wilson remains the great outstand- 
ing figure of the peace. Broken in health and shattered in body, Mr. Wilson is 
leaving the White House, but his spirit still dominates the scene. It pervades 
every chancellery in Europe. It hovers over every capital. Because Woodrow 
Wilson was President of the United States during the most critical period of modern 
history international relations have undergone their first far-reaching moral 
revolution. 

Mr. Harding is assuming the duties of the Presidency, but the main interest in 
Mr. Harding is still a reflected interest, which is concerned chiefly with the efforts 
that his Administration may make to adjust itself to the forces that Mr. Wilson 
has set in motion. Stripped of all the paraphernalia of his office, Mr. Wilson, by 
virtue of his achievements, remains the most potent single influence in the modern 
world; yet after this eight years in the White House it may be doubted if even the 
American people themselves know him better or understand him better than they 
did the day he was first inaugurated. 

Neither Mr. Wilson's friends nor his enemies have ever succeeded in interpreting 
him or in explaining him, nor can any interpretation or explanation be satisfactory 
which fails at the outset to recognize in him the simplest and at the same time the 
most complex character in the greatest drama ever played on the stage of human 
history. Even his closest associates have never found it easy to reconcile a fervent 
political democracy with an unbending intellectual aristocracy, or to determine 
which of those characteristics was dominant in his day-to-day decisions. 

No man ever sat in the President's chair who was more genuinely a democrat or 
held more tenaciously to his faith in democracy than Woodrow Wilson, but no other 
man ever sat in the President's chair who was so contemptuous of all intellect 
that was inferior to his own or so impatient with its laggard processes. 

81 



^ T^resident Who T)ea/f in Ideas 

Mr. Wilson was a President who dealt almost excliisiveh- in ideas. He cared 
little or nothing about political organization and rarely consulted the managing 
politicians of his party. When they conferred with him it was usually at their 
request and not at his request. Patronage hardly entered into his calculations as 
an agency of government. He disliked to be troubled about appointments, and 
when he had filled an office he was likelrto be indifferent as to the manner in which 
that office was subsequently administered, unless his own measures were antag- 
onized or his policies obstructed. 

No man was ever more impersonal in his attitutie toward government, and that 
very impersonality was the characteristic which most baffled the American people. 
Mr. Wilson had a genius for the advocacy of great principles, but he had no talent 
whatever for advocating himself, and to a country that is accustomed to think in 
headlines about political questions his subtlety of mind and his careful, precise 
style of expression were quite as likely to be an obstacle to the communication of 
thought as a medium for the communication of thought. That is how such 
phrases as "too proud to fight" and "peace without victory" were successfully 
wrested from their context by his critics and twisted into a fantastic distortion ot 
their true meaning. 

Mr. Wilson was likewise totally deficient in the art ot advertising, and advertis- 
ing is the very breath of American politics. He held himself aloof from all these 
points of public contact. The JVorld's relations with him have certainly been as 
close and intimate as those of any other newspaper; yet during the eight years, in 
which Mr. Wilson has been in the White House he never sought a favor from The 
World, he never asked for support either for himself or any of his policies, he never 
complained when he was criticised, he never ofi^"ered to explain himself or his attitude 
on any issue of government. In the troublesome days of his Administrai:ion he 
often expressed his gratitude for services that The World had rendered in the 
interpretation of his policies, but he never solicited such interpretation or took 
measures to facilitate it. He was ap eloquent pleader for the principles in which he 
believed, but he had no faculty whatever for projecting himself into the picture. 



The Experience of History 



Mr. Wilson's enemies are fond of calling him a theorist, but there is little ot the 
theorist about him, otherwise he could never have made more constructive history 
than any other man of his generation. What are commonly called theories in his 
case were the practical application of the experience of history to the immediate 
problems of government, and in the experience of history Mr. Wilson is an expert. 
With the exception of James Madison, who was called "the Father of the Ccnstitu- 
tion," Mr. Wilson is the most profound student of government among all the 
Presidents, and he had what Madison conspicuously lacked, which was the faculty 
to translate his knowledge of government into the administration of government 

When Mr. Wilson was elected President he had reached the conclusion which 
most unprejudiced students of American government eventually arrive at — that the 
system of checks and balances is unworkable in practice and that the legislative 
and executive branches cannot be in fact coordinate, independent departments. 
Other Presidents have acted on that hypothesis without daring to admit it, and 

82 



endeavored to control Congress by patronage and by threats. Mr. Wilson 
without any formality established himself as the leader of his party in Congress, 
Premier as well as President, and the originator of the party's program of 
legislation. 

Senators and Representatives denounced him as an autocrat and a dictator. 
Congress was described as the President's rubber stamp, but Mr. Wilson established 
something that more nearly resembled responsible government than anything that 
had gone before, and Congress under his direct leadership made a record for con- 
structive legislation for which there is no parallel. It was due to this kind of 
leadership that such measures as the Federal Reserve Banking Law were enacted, 
which later proved to he the one bulwark lietween the .American people and a 
financial panic of tragic proportions. 

But Mr. Wilson's domtstic policies in spite of their magnitude have been ob- 
scured by his foreign policies. Had there been no war, these policies in themselves 
would have given to the Wilson .Administration a place in .American history higher 
than that of any other since the Civil War. What some of his predecessors talked 
about doing he did, and he accomplished it by the process of making himself the 
responsible leader of his party in Congress— a process that is simple enough but 
capable of fulfillment only in the hands of a man with an extraordinary capacity 
for imposing his will on his associates. Mr. Wilson's control over Congress for six 
years was once described as the most impressive triumph of mind over matter 
known to .American politics. 

J^Cr. in/so//\( Foreign 'Policies 

When we begin the consideration of Mr. Wilson's foreign policies we are entering 
one of the most remarkable chapters in all history, and one which will require the 
perspective of history for a true judgment. 

The first step in the development of these foreign policies came in Mr. Wilson's 
r fusal to recognize Huerta, who had participated in the plot to murder President 
Madero and made himself the dictator of Mexico by reason of this assassination. 
The crime was committed during Mr. Taft's .Administration. When Mr. Wilson 
came into office he served notice that there would be no recognition of Huerta and 
no recognition of any Mexican Government which was not established by due 
process of law. 

What was plainly in .Mr. Wilson's mind was a determination to end political 
a.ssassination in Latin .America as a profitable industry, and compel recognition, 
to some extent at least, of democratic principles and constitutional forms. On this 
issue he had o face the intense opposition of all the financial interests in the United- 
States which had Mexican holdings, and a consolidated European opposition as 
well. Every dollar of foreign money invested in Mexico was confident that what 
Mexico needed most was such a dictatorship as that of Huerta or American inter- 
vention. Mr. Wilson's problem was to get rid of Huerta without involving the 
United States in war, and th;n by steady pressure bring about the establishment of 
a responsible government that rested on something at least resembling the consent 
of the governed. Only a statesman of high ideals would ever have attempted it, 
and only a statesman of almost infinite patience would have been able to adhere 
to the task that Mr. Wilson set for himself. 

83 



Mexico is not yet a closed incident, but Mr. Wilson's policy has been vindicated 
in prin iple. For the first time since Mr. Roosevelt shocked the moral sense and 
aroused the political resentment of all the Latin-American states by the rape of 
Panama, faith in the integrity and friendship of the United States has been restored 
among the other nations of the Western Hemisphere. 

Of equal or even greater ethical importance was Mr. Wilson's insistence on 
the repeal of the Panama Canal Tolls Act, which discriminated in favor of American 
ships in spite of the plain provisions of the Hay-Pauncefote treaty. This was the 
more creditable on Mr. Wilson's part because he himself had been tricked during 
the campaign into giving his support to this measure. When he began to perceive 
the diplomatic consequences of this treaty violation Mr. Wilson reversed himself 
and demanded that Congress reverse itself. Had he done otherwise, the American 
people would have had scant opportunity to protest against the German perfidy 
which turned a treaty into "a scrap of paper." 

W^hen Germany, at the beginning of August, 1914, declared war successively on 
Russia, France and Belgium, thereby bringing Great Britain into the most stu- 
pendous conflict of all the centuries, Mr. Wilson did what every President has done 
when other nations have gone to war. He issued a proclamation of neutrality. He 
then went futher, however, than any of his predecessors had done and urged the 
American people to be not only neutral in deed but "impartial in thought." Mr. 
Wilson has been severely criticised for this appeal. The more violent pro-Germans 
and the more violent pro-French and pro-British regarded it as a personal insult 
and an attempt on the part of the President to stifle what they were pleased to 
regard as their conscience. 

Mr. W^ilson asked the American people to be impartial in thought because he knew 
as a historian the danger that threatened if the country were to be divided into 
two hostile camps, the one blindly and unreasoningly applauding every act of the 
Germans and the other blindly and unreasoningly applauding every act of the 
Allies. In the early years of his life the Republic was all but wrecked by the 
emotional and political excesses of the pro-French Americans and the pro-British 
Americans in the war that followed the French Revolution. The warning against 
a passionate attachment to the interests of other nations which is embodied in 
Washington's Farewell Address was the first President's solemn admonition against 
the evils of a divided allegiance. Mr. Wilson had no desire to see the country drift 
into a similar situation in which American rights, American interests and American 
prestige would all be sacrificed to gratify the American adherents of the various 
European belligerents. Moreover, he understood far better than his critics that 
issues would soon arise between the belligerents and the United States which would 
require on the part of the American people that impartiality of thought that is 
demanded of the just and upright judge. He knew that the American people 
might ultimately become the final arbiters of the issues of the conflict. 

The United States was the only great nation outside the sphere of conflict. It 
was the only great nation that had no secret diplomatic understandings with either 
set of belligerents. It was the only great nation that was in a position to uphold 
the processes of international law and to use its good offices as a mediator when the 
opportunity arose. 

For two years Mr. Wilson genuinely believed that it would be possible for the 
United States to fulfill this mission, and he never fully lost hope until that day in 

84 



January, 1917, when the German Government wantonly wrecked all the informal 
peace negotiations that were then in progress and decided to stake the fate of the 
empire on a single throw of the U-boat dice. 

zA United Coufitry First 

Mr. Wilson perceived quite as quickly and quite as early as anybody the possi- 
bility that the United States would be drawn into the war, but he perceived also 
what most of his critics failed to perceive, that the immediate danger of the country 
was not war but a divided people. While he was engaging in framing the first 
Lusitania note he discussed the situation with one of his callers at the White House 
in words that have since proved prophetic: 

I do nor know whether the German Government intends to keep faith with 
the United States or not. It is my personal opinion that Germany has no such 
intention, but I am less concerned about the ultimate intentions of Germany 
than about the attitude of the American people, who are alreadv divided 
into three groups: those who are strongly pro-German, those who are strongly 
pro-.Ally, and the vast majority who expect me to find a way to keep the 
United States out of war. I do not want war, yet I do not know that I can 
keep the country out of the war. That depends on Germany, and I have no 
control over Germany. But I intend to handle this situation in such a manner 
that every American citizen will know that the United States Cmernment has done 
everything it could to prevent war. Then if war comes we shall have a united coun- 
try, and with a united country there need be no fear about the result. 

Mr. Wilson's policy from that day to .April 2, 191 7, must be read in the light of 
those words. He plunged forthwith into that extraordinary debate with the 
German Government over the submarine issue — the most momentous debate ever 
held — but he was only incidentally addressing himself to the rulers of Germany. 
He was talking to the conscience of the civilized world, but primarily to the con- 
science of the United States, explaining, clarifying, elucidating the issue. His 
reluctance to countenance any extensive measures of preparedness was the product 
of a definite resolution not to give Germany and her American supporters an 
opportunity to declare that the United States, while these issues were pending, was 
arming for war against the Imperial Government. 

When Mr. Wilson began this debate he knew something which his critics did 
not know and which for reasons of state he did not choose to tell them. Weeks 
before the destruction of the Lusitania two-thirds of the German General Staff 
were in favor of war with the United States as a military measure in the interest of 
Germany. They were under the spell of Tirpitz. They believed that the sub- 
marine could do all that the Grand Admiral said it could do. They argued that 
inasmuch as the Allies were borrowing money in the United States, obtaining food 
from the United States and purchasing great quantities of munitions in the United 
States Germany, by restricting submarine warfare in answer to American protests, 
was paying an excessive price for what was in effect a fictitious neutrality. In their 
opinion the United States as a neutral was already doing more for the Allies than 
it could do as an active belligerent if free scope were given to the U-boats. The 
American Navy, they said, could be safely disregarded, because with Germany 
already blockaded by the British Navy, and the German Grand Fleet penned in, 
the addition of the American Navy, or a dozen navies for that matter, would make 

85 



little difference in respect to the actual facts of sea power. On the other hand 
there was not enough shipping available to feed the Allies and enable the United 
States to send an army to Europe. If the United States tried to provide troops, 
the British would starve. If the United States could not send troops, Germany 
would be just as well off with the United States in the war as out of the war, and 
would have the priceless additional advantage of being able to employ her sub- 
marines as she Saw fit, regardless of the technicalities of international law. 

In the fall of 1916 Mr. Wilson decided definitely that the relations between the 
United States and Germany were approaching a climax. It the war continued 
much longer the United States would inevitably be drawn in. There was no 
prospect of a decision. The belligerent armies were deadlocked. Unwilling to 
wait longer for events, Mr. Wilson made up his mind that he would demand from 
each side a statement of its aims and objects and compel each side to plead its 
own cause before the court of the public opinion of the world. This was done on 
December 18, 1916, in a joint note which was so cold and dispassionate in its terms 
that its import was hardly understood. 

IVit/i C^ea?i Hands 

The President said that the aims and objects of the war on both sides "as stated 
in general terms to their own people and the world" seemed to be "virtually the 
same," and he asked for a bill of particulars. Instantly there was wild turmoil 
and recrimination on the part of the Allies and their friends in the United States. 

The President had declared, they said, that the Germans and the Allies were 
fighting for the same thing. Mr. Wilson had expressed no opinion of his own one 
way or the other and the obvious discovery was soon made in London and Paris 
that the President had given to the Allies the opportunity which they needed of 
officially differentiating their war aims from those of the Germans. The German 
Government missed its opportunity completely, and by their own answer to the 
President's note the Allies succeeded in consolidating their moral positions, which 
was something they had never previously been able to do in spite of all their 
propaganda. 

Informal peace negotiations were still in progrcvss, although conducted in secret 
and carefully screened from the knowledge of all peoples involved in the conflict. 
On January 22, 1917, Mr. Wilson made his last attempt at mediation in the "peace 
without victory" address to the Senate in which he defined what he regarded as 
the fundamental conditions of a permanent peace. Most of the basic principles 
of this address were afterward incorporated into the Fourteen Points. Here again 
Mr. Wilson was the victim of his own precision of language and of the settled policy 
of his critics of reading into his public utterances almost everything except what he 
actually said. He himself has insisted on giving his own interpretation of "peace 
without victory," and this interpretation was instantly rejected by the super- 
patriots who regarded themselves as the sole custodians of all the issues of the war. 
When the armistice was signed one of the most eminent of living British states- 
men gave it as his opinion that the war had lasted two years too long, and that 
the task of salvaging an enduring peace from the wreck had become well-nigh 
insuperable. It will always be one of the fascinating riddles of history to guess 
what the result would have been if Mr. Wilson's final proposals for mediation 

86 




^ L •: .-/ .. '■ ," I nderuoud 

1919: On the bridge of the George Washington on the return from the 
Peace Conference 



The President and the Treaty 

President Wilson sails for Europe, December 4, 1918. 
Visits to England, France and Ital\, December-January, 

1918-19. 
Peace Conference opened, January 18, 1919. 
League Covenant adopted, February 14, 1919. 
President Wilson's trip home, February 24-March 5, 1919. 
The treat \ signed, June 28, 1919. 
Submission to the Senate, July 10, 1919. 
The President's speaking tour, September 3-26, 1919. 
Adoption of the Lodge reservations, November 16, 1919. 
Final defeat of the treaty in the Senate, March 20, 1920. 




Ed mention 

February 15. 19J1 : Air. Wilson's latest photograph— made at a meeting 

of the Cabinet 



TWO PICTURES 

By Joseph }'. Tumulty 

Tzco pictitirs ore in my mind, first, the Hall of Representa- 
tives croivdcd from flo.ir to galli^ry -a'itli expectant tlirongs. 
Presently it is anuouneed that the /'resident of the L'uitcd Stales 
Zi'ill address Congress. There steps ont to the Speaker's desk a 
straight, vigorous, slender man. aetive and alert. He is sixty 
years of age. hut he looks not more than forty-five, so lithe of 
limb, so alert of bearing, so virile. It is U'oodrozv Wilson read- 
ing his great zcar message. The other pieture is 0)ily three and 
o half years later. There is a parade of I'eterans of the Great 
ll'ar. They are to be rcviezi^'ed by the ['resident on the east 
terrace of the White House. In a chair sits a man, your Presi- 
dcnt. broken in health, but still alert in mind. His hair is zehite, 
his shoulders bozi'cd, his figure bent. He is sixty-three years old. 
but he looks older. It is Jl'oodrozi' JVilson. Presently, in the 
procession there appears an ambulance laden zvith zvoundcd sol- 
diers, the maimed, the halt and the blind. As they pass they 
salute, slozely reverently. The President's right hand goes up in 
anszi'cring salute. I glanced at him. There zeere tears in his 
eyes. The zcounded is greeting the zcounded ; those in the ambu- 
lance, lie in the chair, are, alike, casualties of the Great War. 

From address by Joseph P. Tumullv 
Thursday. Oct. 28. 1920 



had been accepted. The I'nited States would not have entered the war, and a 
less violent readjustment of the internal affairs of Europe would probably have 
resulted. There would have been no Bolshevist revolution in Russia and no eco- 
nomic collapse of Europe. Nor is it certain that most of the really enduring bene- 
fits of the Treaty of Versailles could not have been as well obtained by negotia- 
tion as they were finaly obtained through a military victory which cost a price 
that still staggers humanity. 

Be that as it may, the German Government, now fighting to maintam the dy- 
nasty and the Junker domination, took the issue out of Mr. Wilson's hands. Ten 
days after his "peace without victory" address the German autocracy put into 
effect its cherished programme of ruthless submarine warfare. The only possible 
answer on the part of the United States was the dismissal of Count von Bernstorff 
the German .'\mbassador, and from that time war between the United States and 
Germanv was onlv a matter of days. But Mr. Wilson had achieved the great 
purpose that he had formulated two years before. He had been balked in his efforts 
at mediation, but he had united the .American people on the issues of the conflict. 
He had demonstrated to them that their (Government had exerted every honorable 
means to avoid war and that its hands were clean. There was no uncertainty in 
their own minds that the responsibility for the war rested solely on Germany, 
and Mr. Wilson now purposed to write the terms of peace with the sword. 

V/^V/// to d f*/7/J7/^/<^ 

Mr. Wilson's War .Address on the night of -April 2, 1917, was the most dramatic 
event that the National Capitol had ever known. In the presence of both branches 
of Congress, of the Supreme Court, of the Cabinet and of the Diplomatic Corps, 
Mr. Wilson summoned the American people not to a war but to a crusade in words 
that instantaneously captivated the imagination of the Nation: 

But the right is more precious than neace, and we shall fight for the things 
which we have always carried nearest our hearts— for democracy, for the right 
of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own government, tor 
the rights and liberties of small nations, for a universal dominion ot right In 
such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to al nations and 
make the world at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our liv-es and cur 
fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride 
of those who know that the day has come when .America is privileged to spend 
her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness 
and the peace which she has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.. 

This was not W.oodrow Wilson, the intellectual aristocrat, who was speaking, 
but Woodrow Wilson, the fervent democrat, proclaiming a new declaration of 
independence to the embattled peoples. 

No sooner had Congress declared war than Mr. Wilson proceeded to mobilize 
all the resources of the Nation and throw them into the conflict. This war was 
different from any other war in which the United States had ever engaged, not 
only by reason of its magnitude but by reason of the necessity for coordinating 
.American military plans with the military plans of the Allies. The Allies were not 
quite agreed as to what they desired of the United States, aside from unlimited 
financial assistance, and the solution of the general problem depended more or 

less on the trend of events. 

89 



The test of any war policy is its success, and it is a waste of time to enter into a 
vindication of the manner in which the Wilscn Administration made war, or to 
trouble about the accusations of waste and extravagance, as if war were an eco- 
nomic process which coujd be carried on prudently and frugally. The historian 
is not likely to devote serious attention to the partisan accusations relating to 
Mr. Wilson's conduct of the war, but he will find it interesting to record the manner 
in which the President brought his historical knowledge to bear in shaping the war 
policies of the country. 

The voluntary system and the draft system had both been discredited in the 
Civil War, so Mr. Wilson demanded a Selective-Service Act under which the coun- 
try could raise 10,000,000 troops, if 10,000,000 troops were needed, without de- 
ranging its essential industries. It had taken Mr. Lincoln three years to find a 
General whom he could intrust with the command of the Union armies. Mr. 
Wilson picked his Commander in Chief beifore he went to war and then gave to 
Gen. Pershing the same kind of ungrudging support that Mr. Lincoln gave to 
Gen. Grant. The Civil War had been financed by greenbacks and bond issues 
peddled by bankers. Mr. Wilson called on the American people to finance their 
own war, and they unhesitatingly responded. In the war with Spain the commis- 
sary system had broken down completely owing to the antiquated methods that 
were employed. No other army in time of war was ever so well fed or so well 
cared for as that of the United States in the conflict with Germany. 

Wilson as a War 'President 

Mistakes there were in plenty, both in methods and in the choice of men, and 
errors of judgment and the shortcomings that always result from a lack of expe- 
rience, but the impartial verdict of history must be that when everything is set 
forth on the debit side of the balance sheet which can be set forth Mr. Wilson 
remains the most vigorous of all the war Presidents. Yet it is also true that history 
will concern itself far less with Mr. Wilson as a war President than with Mr. Wilson 
as a peace-making President. It is around him as a peace-making President that 
all the passions and prejudices and disappointments of the world still rage. 

Mr. Wilson in his "peace without victory" address to the Senate previous to 
the entrance of the United States into the war had sketched a general plan of a 
cooperative peace. "I am proposing, as it were," he said, "that the nations with 
one accord should adopt the doctrine of President Monroe as the doctrine of the 
world." He returned to the subject again in his War Address, in which he defined 
the principles for which the United States was to fight and the principles on which 
an enduring peace could be made. The time came when it was necessary to be 
still more specific. 

In the winter of 1918 the morale of the Allies was at its lowest ebb. Russia 
had passed into the hands of the Bolsheviki and was preparing to make a separate 
peace with Germany. There was widespreail discontent in Italy, and everywhere 
m Europe soldiers and civilians were asking one another what they were really 
fighting for. On January 8 Mr. Wilson went before Congress and delivered the 
address which contained the Fourteen Points of peace, a message which was greeted 
both in the United States and in Europe as a veritable Magna Charta of the nations. 
Mr. Wilson had again become the spokesman of the aspirations of mankind, and 

90 



from the moment that this address was delivered the thrones of the HohenzoUerns 
and the Hapsburgs ceased to be stable. 

Ten months later they were to crumble and collapse. Before the armistice 
was signed on Nov. ii, 1918, Mr. Wilson had overthrown the doctrine of Divine 
right m Europe. The Hapsburgs ran away. The Kaiser was compelled to abdicate 
and take refuge in exile, justifying his flight by the explanation that Wilson would 
not make peace with Germany while a Hohenzollern was on the throne. This was 
the climax of Mr. Wilson's power and influence and, strangely enough, it was the 
dawn of his own day of disaster. 

For nearly six years Mr. Wilson had manipulated the Government of the United 
States with a skill that was almost uncanny. He had turned himself from a mi- 
nority President into a majority President. He had so deftly outmanoeuvred all 
his opponents in Congress and out of Congress that they had nothing with which 
to console themselves except their intensive hatred of the man and all that pertained 
to him. Then at the very summit of his career he made his first fatal blunder. 

Every President in the ofl%.year election urges the election of a Congress of his 
own party. That is part of the routine of politics, and during the campaign of 
I918 Mr. Wilson's advisers urged him to follow the precedent. What they forgot 
and he forgot was that it was no time for partisan precedents, and he allowed 
his distruct of the Republican leaders in Congress to sweep him into an inexcusable 
error that he, of all men, should have avoided. The Sixty-fifth Congress was 
anything but popular. The Western farmers were aggrieved because the price of 
wheat had been regulated and the price of cotton had not. The East was greatly 
dissatisfied with the war taxes, which it regarded as an unfair discrimination, 
and It remembered Mr. Kitchin's boast that the North wanted the war and the 
North would have to pay for it. There was general complaint from business 
interests against the Southern Democratic control of the legislative department, 
and all this sentiment instantly crystallized when the President asked for another 
Democratic Congress. Republicans who were loyally supporting the Adminis- 
tration in all its war activities were justly incensed that a party issue had been 
raised. A Republican Congress was elected and by inference the President sus- 
tained a personal defeat. 

Misfortunes did not come singly in Mr. Wilson's case. Following the mistake 
of appealing for the election of a Democratic Congress he made an equally serious 
mistake in the selection of his Peace Commission. 

To anybody who knows Mr. Wilson, who knows Mr. Lloyd George, who 
knows Mr. Clemenceau, nothing could be sillier than the chapters of Keynes and 
Dillon in which they undertake to picture the President's unfitness to cope with 
the European masters of diplomacy. Mr. Wilson for years had been playing with 
European masters of diplomacy as a cat plays with a mouse. To assume that Mr. 
Wilson was ever deceived by the transparent tactics of Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. 
Clemenceau is to assume the impossible. It would be as easy to conceive of his 
being tricked and bamboozled by the United States Senate. 

The T'eace Commission 

Mr. Wilson needed strong Republican representation on the Peace Commission 
not to reinforce him in his struggles with his adversaries at Paris but to divide 

91 



with him the responsibility tor a treaty of peace that was doomed in advance to 
be a.disappointment. Although the popular sentiment of Europe was almost pas- 
; ionate in its advocacy ot President Wilson's peace f»rogram^ all the special 
interests that were seeking to capitalize the peace for their own advantage or 
profit were actively at work and were beginning to swing all the influence that they 
could command on their various Governments. It was inevitable from the outset 
that Mr. Wilson could never get the peace that he had expected. The treaty was 
bound to be a series of compromises that would satisfy nobody, and when Mr. 
Wilson assumed all the responsibility for it in advance he assumed a responsibility 
that no stateman who had ever lived could carry alone. Had he taken Mr. Root 
or Mr. Taft or both of them with him the terms of the Treaty of Versailles might 
have been no different, but the Senate would have been robbed of the partisan 
grievance on which it organized the defeat of ratification. 

Day after da\' during the conference Mr. Wilson fought the fight for a peace 
that represented the liberal thought of the world. Day after day the odds against 
him lengthened. The contest finally resolved itself into a question of whether 
he should take what he could get or whether he should withdraw from the confer- 
ence and throw the doors open to chaos. The President made the only decision 
that he had a moral right to make. He took what he could get, nor are the states- 
men with whom he was associated altogether to blame because he did not get 
more. They too had to contend against forces over which they had no control. 
They were not free agents either, and Mr. Smuts has summed up the case in two 
sentences: 

It was not the statesmen that failed so much as the spirit of the peoples'—- 
behind them. The hope, the aspiration, for a new world order of peace and 
right and justice, however deeply and universally felt, was still only feeble 
and ineffective in comparison with the dominant national passions which found 
their expression in the peace treaty. 

All the passions and hatreds bred of four years of merciless warfare, all the 
insatiable fury tor revenge, all the racial ambitions that had been twisted and per- 
verted by centuries of devious djplomac) — these were all gathered around the 
ccuncil table, clamorous in their demand to dictate the terms. 

Mr. Wilson surrendered more than he dreamed he was surrendering, but it is 
not difficult to follow his line of reasoning. The League of Nations was to be a 
continuing court of equity, sitting in judgment on the peace itself, revising its 
terms when revision became necessary and possible, slowly readjusting the pro- 
visions of the treaty to a calmer and saner state of public mind. Get peace first. 
Kstablish the I-eague, and the League would rectify the inevitable mistakes of 
the treaty. 

It is a curious commentar\' on human nature that when the treat) was completed 
and the storm of wrath broke, all the rage, all the resentment, all the odium should 
have fallen on the one man who had struggled week in and w^ek out against the 
forces of reaction anti revenge and had written into the treaty all that it contains 
which makes for the international advancement of the race. 

Why The Treaty JVas beaten 

Into that reconi must also go the impressive fact that the Treaty of \'ersailles 
was rejected In the I'nited States Senate, under the leadership of Henry Cabot 

92 



Lodge, not because of its acknowledged defects and shortcomings, not because it 
breathed the spirit of a Carthaginian peace in its punitive clauses, but because of 
its most enlightened provision, the covenant of the League of Nations, which is 
the one hope of a war-racked world. 

When people speak of the tragedy of Mr. Wilson's career they have in mind only 
the temporary aspects of it — the universal dissatisfaction with the treaty of peace, 
his physical collapse, his defeat in the Senate and the verdict at the polls in No- 
vember. They forget that the end of the chapter is not yet written. The League 
of Nations is a fact, whatever the attitude of the United States may be toward it, 
and it will live unless the peoples of the earth prove their political incapacity to 
use it for the promotion of their own welfare. The principle of self-determination 
will remain as long as men believe in the right of self-government and are willing 
to die for it. It was Woodrow Wilson who wrote that principle into the law of 
nations, even though he failed to obtain a universal application of it. Tacitus said 
of the Catti tribesmen, "Others go to battle; these go to war," and Mr. Wilson 
went to war in behalf of the democratic theory of government extended to all the 
affairs of the nations. That war is not yet won, and the Commander in Chief is 
crippled by the wounds that he received on the field of action. But the responsi- 
bility for the future does not rest with him. It rests with the self-governing 
peoples for whom he has blazed the trail. All the complicated issues of this titanic 
struggle finally reduce themselves to these prophetic words of Maximilian Harden: 
"Only one conqueror's work will endure — Wilson's thought." 

Woodrow Wilson on this morning of the fourth of March can say, in the words 
of Paul the Apostle to Timothy: 

''For I am now ready to be offered, and the time of my departure is at hand. 
" I have fought a good fight, I have finished my course, I have kept the faith.'' 
Copyright 1921, New York Wo^ld. 



Ol)^ (Tovenant of tl)e league of Nations 

ADOPTED BY THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE 
Paris, April 28, igiQ 



Preamble 

In order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international 
peace and securitv, bv the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the 
prescription of open, iust and honorable relations between nations, by the firm 
establishment of the understandings of international law as to actual rule of con- 
duct among governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous 
respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one 
another, the high contracting parties agree to this Covenant of the League of 
Nations. 

93 



Article One 

[Membership] 

The original members of the League of Nations shall be those of the signatories 
which are named in the annex to this Covenant and also such of those other states 
named in the annex as shall accede without reservation to this Covenant. Such 
accessions shall be effected by a declaration deposited with the Secretariat within 
two months of the coming into force of the Covenant. Notice thereof shall be 
sent to all other members of the League. 

Any fully self-governing state, dominion, or colony not named in the annex, 
may become a member of the League if its admission is agreed by two-thirds of 
the assembly, provided that it shall give effective guarantees of its sincere intention 
to observe its international obligations, and shall accept such regulations as may 
be prescribed by the League in regard to its military and naval forces and arma- 
ments. 

Any member of the League may, after two years' notice of its intention so to 
do, withdraw from the League, provided that all its international obligations and 
all its obligations under this Covenant shall have been fulfilled at the time of its 
withdrawal. 

Article Two 

[Executive and Administration Machinery] 
The action of the League under this Covenant shall be effected through the 
instrumentality of an Assembly and of a Council, with a permanent Secretariat. 

Article Three 

[The Assembly] 

The Assembly shall consist of representatives of the members of the League. 

The Assembly shall meet at stated intervals and from time to time as occasion 
may require, at the seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided 
upon. 

The Assembly may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of 
action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. 

At meetings of the Assembly, each member of the League shall have one vote, 
and may have not more than three representatives. 

Article Four 

[The Council] 

The Council shall consist of representatives of the United States of America> 
of the British Empire, of France, of Italy, and of Japan, together with representa- 
tives of four other members of the League. These four members ot the Leap'i' - 
shall be selected bv the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Until tiw 
appointment of the representatives of the four members of the League first selected 
by the Assembly, representatives of Belgium, Brazil, Greece and Spain shall be 
members of the Council. 

With the approval of the majority of the Assembly, the Council may name 
additional members of the League whose representatives shall always be members 
of the Council; the Council with like approval may increase the number of mern- 
bers of the League to be selected by the Assembly for representation on the Council. 

The Council shall meet from time to time as occasion may require, and at least 
once a year, at the seat of the League, or at such other place as may be decided upon. 

The Council may deal at its meetings with any matter v/ithin the sphere of 
action of the League or affecting the peace ot the world. 

Any member of the League not represented on the Council shall be invited to 
send a representative to sit as a member at any meeting of the Council during the 
consideration of matters specially affecting the interests of that member ot the 
League. 

At meetings of the Council, each member of the League represented on the 
Council shall have one vote, and may have not more than one representative. 

94 



Article Five 

[Decision by Unanimity or Majority; Initial Meetings] 

Except where otherwise expressly provided in this Covenant, or by the terms 

of this treaty, decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the Council shall 

require the agreement of all the members of the League represented at the meetmg. 

All matters of procedure at meetings of the Assembly or of the Council, the 

appointment of committees to investigate particular matters, shall be regulated 

by the Assemblv or by the Council and may be decided by a majority of the 

members of the League represented at the meeting. •, , ,, 

The first meeting of the Assembly and the first meeting at the Council shall 

be summoned by the President of the United States of America. 

Article Six 

[The Secretariat] 

The permanent Secretariat shall be established at the seat of the League. The 
Secretariat shall comprise a Secretary-General and such secretaries and staff as 
mav be required. 

The first Secretarv-General shall be the person named m the annex; thereafter 
the Secretary-General shall be appointed by the Council with the approval of the 
maioritv of the Assemblv. 

"The'Secretaries and the statTof the Secretariat shall be appointed by the Secre- 
tarv-General with the approval of the Council. 

The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity at all meetings of the Assembly 
and of the Council. 

The expenses of the Secretariat shall be borne by the members of the League 
in accordance with the apportionment of the expenses of the International Bureau 
of the Universal Postal Union. 

Article Seven 
(League Capital; Status of Officials and Property; Sex Equality] 

The seat of the League is established at Geneva. 

The Council may at any time decide that the seat of the League shall be estab- 
lished elsewhere. 

All positions under or in connection with the League, including the Secretariat, 
shall be open ecjually to men and women. 

Representatives of the members of the League and officials of the League when 
engaged on the business of the League shall enjoy diplomatic privileges and immu- 
nities. 

The buildings and other property occupied by the League or its officials or by 
representatives attending its meetings shall be inviolable. 

Article Eight 

[Disarmament] 

The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of a peace requires 
the reduction of national armaments to the lov/est point consistent with the national 
safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations. 

The Council, taking account of the geographical situation and circuinstances 
of each state, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and 
action of the several governments. 

Such plans shall be subject to reconsideration and revision at least every ten 
years. 

After these plans shall have been adopted by the several governments, limits 
of armaments therein fixed shall not be exceeded without the concurrence of the 
Council. 

The members of the League agree that the manufacture by private enterprise 
of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections. The Council 
shall advise how the evil effects attendant lipon such manufacture can be prevented, 

<95 



due regarti being had to the necessities of those members of the League whith are 
not able to manufacture the munitions ami implements of war necessarv for their 
safety. 

The members of the League undertake to interchange full and frank informa- 
tion as to the scale of their armaments, their military and naval programmes and 
the condition of such of their industries as are adaptable to warlike purposes. 

Article Nine 

[Disarmament Commission] 
A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the 
execution of the provisions of Articles One and Eight and on military and naval 
questions generally. 

Article Ten 

[Territorial and Political Guarantees] 
The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against 
externa! aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of 
all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat 
or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which 
this obligation shall be fulfilled. 

Article Eleven 

[Joint Action to Prevent War] 

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the members 
of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, 
and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to 
safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the 
Secretary-General shall, on the request of any member of the League, forthwith 
summon a meeting of the Council. 

It is also declared to be the fundamental right of each member of the League 
to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance 
whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb either the 
peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends. 

Article Twelve 

[Postponement of War] 

The members of the League agree that if there should arise between them, any 
dispute likeU' to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration 
or to inquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three 
months after the award by the arbitrators or the report by the Council. 

In any case, under this Article the award of the arbitrators shall be made within 
a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made within six months 
after the submission of the dispute. 

Article Thirteen 

[Arbitration of Justiciable Matters] 

The members of the League agree that when ever any dispute shall arise between 
them which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which 
cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomac)', they will submit the whole subject 
matter to arbitration. Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any 
question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established 
would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the extent and 
nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are declared to be among 
those which are generally suitable for submission to arbitration. For the con- 
sideration of any such dispute the court of arbitration to which the case is referred 
shall be the court agreed on by the parties to the dispute or stipulated in any con- 
vention existing between them. 

The members of the League agree that they will carry out in full good faith any 
awartl that may be rendered and that they will not resort to war against a member 

96 



of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out 
such an award, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect 
thereto. 

Article Fourteen 

[Permanent Court of International Justice] 
The Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the League for 
adoption plans for the establishment of a permanent court of international justice. 
The court shall be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international 
character which the parties thereto submit to it. The court may also give an 
advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referreil to it by the Council or by 
the Assembly. 

Article Fifteen 

[Settlement of Disputes by Council or Assembly; F.xclusion of Domestic Questions 

If there should arise between members of the League any dispute likel)- to tead 
to a rupture, which is not submitted to arbitration as above, the members of the 
League agree that they will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the 
dispute may effect such submission by giving notice of the existence of the dispute 
to the Secretary-General, who will make all necessary arrangements for a full 
investigation and consideration thereof. F'or this purpose the parties to the dis- 
pute will communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible, state- 
ments of their case, all the relevant facts and papers; the Council may forthwith 
direct the publication thereof. 

The Council shall endeavor to effect a settlement of any dispute, and if such 
efforts are successful, a statement shall be made public giving such facts and ex- 
planations regarding the dispute and terms of settlement thereof as the Council 
may deem appropriate. 

If the dispute is not thus settled, the Council either unanimously or by a majority 
.vote shall make and publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the 
dspute and the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard 
thereto. 

Any member of the League represented on the Council may make public a 
statement of the facts of the dispute and of the conclusions regarding the same. 

If a report by the Council is unanimously agreed to by the members thereof 
other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the 
members of the League agree that they will not go to war with any party to the 
dispute which complies with the recommendations of the report. 

If the Council fails to reach a report which is unanimously agreed to by the 
members thereof, other than the representatives of one or more of the parties to 
the dispute, the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take 
such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice. 

If the dispute between the parties is claimed by one of them, and is found by the 
Council to arise out of a matter which by international law is solely within the 
domestic jurisdiction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall make no 
recommendation as to its settlement. 

The Council may in any case under this Article refer the dispute to the Assembly. 
The dispute shall be so referred at the request of either party to the dispute, pro- 
vided that such request be made within fourteen days after the submission of the 
dispute to the Council. 

In any case referred to the Assembly all the provisions of this Article and of 
Article Twelve relating to the action and powers of the Council shall apply to the 
action and piowers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assembly, 
if concurred in by the representatives of those members of the League represented 
on the Council and of a majority of the other members of the League, exclusive 
in each case of the representatives of the parties to the dispute, shall have the same 
force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the members thereof other than 
the representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute. 

97 



Article Sixteen 

[Sanctions] 
Should any member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants 
under Articles Twelve, Thirteen or Fifteen, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have 
committed an act of war against all other members of the League, which hereby 
undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial rela- 
tions, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nations and the nationals of 
the covenant-breaking state and the prevention of all financial, commercial, or 
personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the 
nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League or not. 

It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several 
governments concerned what effective military or naval forces the members of the 
League shall severally contribute to the armaments of forces to be used to protect 
the covenants of the League. 

The members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one 
aaother in the financial and economic rheasures which are taken under this Article, 
in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, 
and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures 
aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking state, and that they will 
take the necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of 
any of the members of the League which are cooperating to protect the covenants 
of the League. 

Any member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may 
be declared to be no longer a member of the League by a vote of the Council con- 
curred in b)- the representatives of all the other members of the League represented 
thereon. 

Article Seventeen 
[Disputes of Non-Members] 
In the event of a dispute between a member of the League nnd a state which is 
not a member of the League, or between states not members of the League, the 
state or states not members of the League shall be invited to accept the obligations 
of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, upon such conditions 
as the Council may deem just. If such invitation is accepted, the provisions of 
Articles Twelve to Sixteen inclusive shall be applied with such modifications as 
may be deemed necessary by the Council. 

Upon such invitation being given, the Council shall immediately institute an 
inquiry into the circumstances of the dispute and recommend such HCtion as may 
seem best and most effectual in the circumstances. 

If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the obligations of membership in the 
League for the purposes of such dispute, and shall resort to war against a member 
of the League, the provisions of Article Sixteen shall be applicable as against the 
state taking such action. 

If both parties to the dispute, when so invited, refuse to accept the obligations 
of membership in the League for the purposes of such dispute, the Council may 
take such measures and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities 
and will result in the settlement of the dispute. 

Article Eighteen 

[Registration of International Engagements] 
Every convention or international engagement entered into henceforward by any 
member of the League shall be forthwith registered with the Secretariat and shall 
as soon as possible be published by it. No such treaty or international engage- 
ment shall be binding until so registered. 

Article Nineteen 

[Revision of Former Treaties] 
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by members 
of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable, and the consideration 

98 



of international conditions ot which the continuance might endanger the peace of 
the worlci. 

Article Twenty 

[Abrogation of Understandings not Consistent with the Covenant] 
The members of the League severally agree that this Covenant is accepted as 
abrogating ail obligations or understandings inter se which are inconsistent with 
the terms thereof, and solemnly unilertake that they will not hereafter enter into 
anv engagements inconsistent with the terms thereof. 

In case members of the League shall, before becoming a member of the League, 
have undertaken any obligation inconsistent with the terms of this covenant, it 
shall be the duty of such member to take immediate steps to procure its release 
from such obligations. 

Article Twentj-One 
[The Monroe Doctrine] 
Nothing in this covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international 
engagements such as treaties of arbitration or regional understamlings like the 
Monroe Doctrine for securing the maintenance of peace. 

Article Twenty-Two 

[Mandatory Tutelage of Colonies and Backward Races] 

To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have 
ceased to be under the sovereignty of the states which formerly governed them and 
which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle 
that the well being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civiliza- 
tion and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in 
this covenant. 

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage 
of such peoples be entrusted to advanced nations who, by reasons of their resources, 
their experience or their geographical position, can best undertake this responsi- 
bility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised 
by them as mandatories on behalf of the League. 

The character ot the mandate must differ according to the stage of the develop- 
ment of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic con- 
dition and other similar circumstances. 

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish L.mpire have reached 
a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be pro- 
visionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assist- 
ance by a mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes 
of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the 
mandatory. 

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the 
mandatory must be responsible for the administration of the territory under con- 
ditions v/hich will guarantee freedom of conscience or religion subject only to the 
maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the 
slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic and the prevention of the estab- 
lishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the 
natives for other than police purposes and the defense of territory and will also 
secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other members of the 
League. 

There are territories, such as Southwest Africa and certain of the South Pacific 
islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population or their small size or 
their remoteness from the centers of civilization cr their geographical contiguity 
to the territory of the mandatory and other circumstances, can be best administered 
under the laws of the mandatory as integral portions of its territory subject to the 
safeguards above mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population. In 
every case of mandate, the mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report 
in reference to the territory committed to its charge. 

99 



The degree of autl ority, control or ;ulministr;ition to be exercised by the 
mandatTry shall, if not previously agree upon by the members of the League, be 
explicitly ciefined in each case by the Council. 

A permanent commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual 
reports of the mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the 
observance of the mandates 

rticle Twenty-Three 
[Humanitarian Provisions; Freedom ot Transit] 

Subject to and in acccrdance with the provisions of international conventions 
existing or hereafter to be agreed upon, the members of the League (a) will endeavor 
to secure and maintain fair and humane conditions ot labor for men, women and 
children both in their own countries and in all countries to which their commercial 
and industrial relations extend, and for that purpose will establish anci maintain 
the necessary international organizations; (b) undertake to secure just treatment 
of the native inhabitants of territories under their control; (c) will entrust the 
League with th; general supervision over the execution of agreements with regarei 
to the traffic in women and children, and the traffic in opium and other dangerous 
drugs; (d) will entrust the League with the general supervision of the trade in 
arms and ammunition with the countries in which the control to this traffic is 
necessary in the common interest; (e) will make provision to secure and maintain 
freedom of communication and of transit and equitable treatment for the com- 
merce of all members of the League. In this connection the special necessities of 
the regions devastated during the war of 1914-1918 shall be in mind; (() will en- 
deavor to take steps in matters of international concern for the prevention and. 
control of disease. 

Article Twenty-Four 

[Control of Liternational Bureaus and Commissions] 
There shall be placed under the direction of the League all international bureaus 
already established by general treaties if the parties to such treaties consent. All 
such international bureaus and all commissions for the regulation of matters of 
international interest hereafter constituted shall be placed under the direction of 
the League. 

In all matters of international interest which are regulated by general conventions 
but which are not placed under the control of international bureaus or commissions, 
the Secretariat of the League shall, subject to the consent of the Council and if 
desired bv the parties, collect and distribute all relevant information and shall 
render any other assistance which may be necessary or desirable. 

The Council may include as part of the expenses of the Secretariat the expenses 
of any bureau or commission which is placed under the direction of the League. 

Article Twenty- Five 

[The Red Cross and International Sanitation] 
The members of the League agree to encourage and promote the establishment 
and cooperation of duly authorized voluntarv national Red Cross organizations 
having as purposes improvement of health, the prevention of disease and the 
mitigation of suffering throughout the world. 

Article Twenty-Six 

[Amendments of the Covenant; Right of Dissent] 
Amendments to this Covenant will take effect when ratified by the members o 
the League whose representatives compose the Council and by a majority of the 
members of the League whose representatives compose the Assembly. 

No such amendment shall bind any member of the League which signifies its 
dissent therefrom, but in that case it shall cease to be a member of the League. 



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